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THE TWO-HEADED DRAGON OF SITING AND
CLEANING UP HAZARDOUS WASTE DUMPS: CAN
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES OR MEDIATION SLAY THE
MONSTER?
Bradford C. Mank*

I. INTRODUCTION

America faces a serious hazardous waste crisis. 1 First, cleanups
of abandoned sites have proceeded at a slow pace, especially where
the United States Envil'onmental Protection Agency (EPA) is in
charge of the cleanup project. 2 Second, it has become difficult to site
new waste disposal facilities because of l'Not-In-My-Back-Yard"
(NIMBY) opposition, which 'persists despite state statutes designed
to preempt local land use bans. 3 Third, because many existing in• Assistant Professor of Law, University of CincinnatI. J.D., 1987, Yale Law School; B.A.,
1983, Harvard University. I wish to thank Joe Tomain, John Applegate, and Paul Caron for
helpful comments on earlier versions of this Article. I also thank the Center for the Study of
Dispute Resolution at the University of Cincinnati College of Law for financial assistance
under grants from the Ohio Commission on Dispute Resolution and Conflict Management, the
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, and Browning-Ferris Industrles. All conclusions and
any errors are my own and in no way should be attributed to any 'Of the funding groups.
1 This Article uses the definition of "hazardous waste" found in Subtitle C of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, as amended by the Hazardous and Solid
Waste Amendments of 1984 and subsequent EPA regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988);
40 C.F.R. §§ 260-62, 264-66, 270-71, 280 (1990); see also Randolph L. Hill, An Overview of

RCRA: The '''Mind-Numbing'' Provisions of the Most Complicated Environmental Statute,
21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,254, 10,256-61 (May 1991). See generally Jeffrey M.
Gaba, Solid Waste and Recycled Materials Under RCRA: Separating Chaff from Wheat, 16
ECOLOGY L.Q. 623 (1989) (examining complexities of definition of "solid waste" under RCRA).
2 See infra notes 91, 98, 128-30 and accompanying text.
3 Neighborhood groups often oppose solid waste as well as hazardous waste facilities. See
infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text. For a discussion of NIMBY opposition to hazardous
waste facilities, see generally Orlando E. Delogu, "NIMBY" Is a National Problem, 35 S.D.
L. REV. 198 (1990); A. Dan Tarlock, Siting New or Expanded Treatment, Storage, or Disposal
Facilities: The Pigs in the Parlors of the 1980s, 17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 429 (1984).
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dustrial and commercial sites have expensive contamination problems, developers frequently exploit virgin land, a misguided practice
in light of the finite amount of irreplaceable pristine land left in the
United States. 4
This Article proposes that communities encourage developers to
reuse or at least remediate abandoned contaminated sites by promising not to oppose the siting of a new waste disposal facility if a
developer remediates a contaminated site in the community. In particular, two types of sites are suitable for remediation and reuse: socalled "orphan" sites-abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites that
now bankrupt, dissolved, or unidentifiable private firms once
owned5-and municipal solid waste (MSW) landfills, which many local
governments may be liable for cleaning up pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA).6
The EPA has a policy of encouraging private parties to remediate
orphan sites, but the policy does not go far enough. 7 Moreover,
commentators have proffered proposals to encourage private parties
to remediate waste sites, but each proposal has significant flaws.
For example, direct economic and tax incentives, although appealing
in theory, are unlikely to find political support. 8 Similarly, imposing
mandatory exactions or linkage fees on developers of new hazardous
waste disposal facilities to compel them to clean up old sites, while
potentially effective, raises substantial problems with regard to the
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. 9 Furthermore, state statutes
requiring mediation and arbitration of siting disputes have failed in
4 John C. Buckley, Reducing the Environmental Impact of CERCLA, 41 S.C. L. REV.
766, 767, 807-13 (1990); see also Jeff Harrington, Pollution Can Kill a Sale: Wise Investors
Checking Under the Real Estate, CINCINNATI ENQUffiER, Apr. 7, 1991, at I-I, col. 2 (dis-

cussing contaminated industrial and commercial properties in Cincinnati).
5 The issue of "orphan" liability is becoming more prominent as the EPA begins to focus
on sites that were used for lengthy periods of time. See William W. Balcke, Note, Superfund
Settlements: The Failed Promise of the 1986 Amendments, 74 VA. L. REV. 123, 149-51 (1988).
This Article addresses orphan liability infra notes 19, 84-127 and accompanying text.
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988); see also infra notes 20-22, 67-83 and accompanying text.
For discussions of liability for municipal solid waste (MSW), see generally Steven Ferrey, The
Toxic Time Bomb: Municipal Liability for the Cl.eanup of Hazardous Waste, 57 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 197 (1988); Rena Steinzor, Local Governments and Superfund: WIw Will Pay the
Tab?, 22 URB. LAW. 79 (1990); Michelle L. Washington, Note, A Proposed Scheme of M1micipal Waste-Generator Liability, 100 YALE L.J. 805 (1990) (describing recent CERCLA liti·
gation involving municipal landfills, and arguing that CERCLA is designed to hold munici·
palities liable).
7 See infra notes 84-130 and accompanying text.
S See infra notes 131-63 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 164-86 and accompanying text.
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most instances to overcome NIMBY opposition to the development
of new waste disposal facilities.lO Even economic incentives have
failed in convincing most communities to accept these facilities, although a few localities have said yes to cash. 11
Commentators have Written extensively about the problems of
siting new hazardous waste disposal facilities and cleaning up old
waste sites, but no one has explored the relationship between these
problems. 12 In particular, some commentators have maintained that
the federal and state governments should employ various economic
incentives to encourage the remediation of abandoned hazardous
waste sites. 13 Other commentators have argued that states should
-preempt local zoning designed to keep out waste disposal facilities,
or require mediation and binding arbitration of disputes involving
the siting of these facilities. 14
This Article will show that neither economic incentives nor mediation alone has been successful in addressing the issues of siting
or remediation, despite good theoretical reasons for the success of
both approaches. This Article advocates a two-pronged approach of
using economic incentives and mediation together to attack the dilemmas of siting and remediation. A developer could offer to remediate an orphan or MSW landfill site, and thereby improve public
safety, in exchange for the opportunity to build a new, less risky
hazardous or solid waste disposal facility.15 In conjunction with me10 See Lawrence S. Bacow & James R. Milkey, Overcoming Local Opposition to Hazardous
Waste Facilities: The Massachusetts Approach, 6 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 270-74 (1982)
(arguing that preemption often does not work because municipalities enact ordinances, and
neighborhood groups litigate, lobby state officials, and employ civil disobedience, to discourage
facilities); infra notes 187-251 and accompanying text; see also supra note 3 and accompanying
text.
11 See, e.g., Jonathan P. Meyers, Note, Confronting the Garbage Crisis: Increased Federal
Involvement as a Means of Addressing Municipal Solid Waste Disposal, 79 GEO. L.J. 567,
572 (1991); infra notes 187-92, 207-08, 247-51 and accompanying text.
12 Compare Kathleen M. Martin, Public/Private Cooperation in the Development of Contaminated Properties, 1990 A.B.A. SEC. REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. L. Tab C, at 7-10 and
Richard L. Stroup, Hazardous Waste Policy: A Property Rights Prospective, 20 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 868, 872 (Sept. 22, 1989) (advocating economic incentives to encourage private parties
to clean up contaminated sites) with MICHAEL O'HARE ET AL. , FACILITY SITlNG AND PUBLlC
OPPOSITION (1983) (discussing how to overcome public opposition to siting waste disposal
facilities) and Delogu, supra note 3 and Tarlock, supra note 3.
13 See generally Martin, supra note 12, at 7-10; Stroup, supra note 12, at 872-73.
14 See generally O'HARE, supra note 12 (discussing mediation and arbitration); Delogu,
supra note 3 (discussing preemption strategies and their limitations); Tarlock, supra note 3,
at 438-80 (discussing preemption strategies and their limitations).
15 The possibility of a developer of a hazardous waste disposal facility offering a state or
municipality the cleanup of an abandoned waste site as compensation for the siting of the
developer's new facility is one proposal in a long list of possible compensatory measures
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diation and negotiated compensation, this proposal may be able to
quell public opposition to new facilities and accelerate the cleanup of
orphan and MSW landfill sites.
Section II of this Article reviews CERCLA's history and structure
and explores "problem" waste sites. The discussion of problem sites
examines orphan sites and MSW landfill sites and considers the
position of prospective purchasers of such sites. Section III analyzes
three incentives for private cleanups: auctions of orphan sites, tax
incentives, and impact fees. Section IV considers whether mediation
and arbitration can overcome NIMBY opposition to siting new waste
disposal facilities. Section V sets forth a proposal for the remediation
and reuse of contaminated sites.
II. CERCLA's PROBLEM CHILDREN
There are thousands of sites in the United States that are contaminated with hazardous waste. This estimate includes the more than
1,000 sites listed on the National Priorities List (NPL)16-sites that
the EPA has estimated will cost at least $30 billion to clean Up.17
Many contaminated sites are located on prime industrial and commercial properties. 18 The precise number of orphan sites is unknown,
because the EPA must perform an extensive investigation to determine whether any solvent parties exist at a site, and the agency has
not done so for many NPL sites. 19 In December 1989, the EPA
presented in a report on hazardous waste siting in North Carolina. MARTIN SMITH ET AL.,
FINAL REPORT: COSTS AND BENEFITS TO LOCAL GoVERNMENT DUE TO PRESENCE OF A
HAzARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITY ANi> RELATED COMPENSATION ISSUES 75 (1985)
(report by Institute for Environmental Studies at University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill). The report did not provide any analysis of this proposal or any hint of whether it ever
has been implemented. One of the authors of the report subsequently reproduced the list of
compensatory measures in a book, but likewise offered no analysis regarding the connection
between the siting and the remediation of orphan hazardous waste sites. RICHARD N.L.
ANDREWS ET AL., HAzARDOUS MATERIALS IN NORTH CAROLINA: A GUIDE FOR DECISIONMAKERS IN LOCAL GoVERNMENT 113 (1985).
16 By 1989, the EPA had compiled an inventory of about 27,000 hazardous waste sites and
placed 1077 of these sites on the National Priorities List (NPL). COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY, TwENTIETH ANNuAL REPORT 16~ (1989).
17 Year-Long Study Set to Evaluate Alternative Superfund Financing, [1990-1991 Transfer
Binder] 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2131, 2131 (Mar. 29, 1991).
18 See Turner T. Smith, Jr., Thoughts on Investing in Contaminated Property-Can Market
Driven Remediation Help?, 1989 A.B.A. SEC. REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. L. I, 1. See generally
ACQUIRING PROBLEM: PROPERTIES: MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK (Real Estate Law and
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 348, 1990) (essays dealing with problems of owning,
selling, and buying contaminated property).
19 Superfund Program; De Minimis Landowner Settlements, Prospective Purchaser Settlements, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235, 34,241 (1989).
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estimated that 320, or about twenty-five percent, of the 1219 proposed and final NPL sites probably involved municipalities or MSW
landfills. 20 Of the 1219 sites, 236, or about twenty percent, actually
were classified as municipal landfills. 21 According to one estimate, in
the future, half of the sites on the NPL will be municipal landfills. 22
While there are a number of differences between the typical orphan site and the typical MSW landfill site, there are two questions
common to both that are worth exploring. First, to what extent can
government agencies use economic incentives to encourage private
parties to perform cleanups of these sites instead of using public
monies? Second, can governments negotiate with developers of new
facilities to remediate old MSW landfill or orphan sites?

A. CERCLA's History and Structure
In 1980, Congress passed CERCLA23 in response to the discovery
of Love Canal and other toxic waste dumps across the nation. 24
Because Congress enacted CERCLA hastily during the final weeks
of the Carter Administration, there is little legislative history indicating how the statute's proponents intended the EPA to achieve its
broad cleanup goals.25 CERCLA authorized the president to respond
to actual or threatened releases of hazardous substances26 and provided $1.6 billion over five years to establish a "Superfund" for
financing cleanups.27 It also instructed the EPA to develop a "na20 Superfund Program; Interim Municipal Settlement Policy, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071, 51,071
(1989); see also Washington, supra note 6, at 808 n.34.
21 Superfund Program; Interim Municipal Settlement Policy, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071, 51,071
(1989); see also Washington, supra note 6, at 808 n.35.
22 Washington, supra note 6, at 808 n.36 (citing OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT,
SUPERFUND STRATEGY 4-5 (1985».
"23 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980).
24 See Balcke, supra note 5, at 123; Roger J. Marzulla & Brett G. Kappel, Lender Liability

Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 41
S.C. L. REV. 705, 705-06 (1990); Lawrence S. Coven, Comment, Liability Under CERCLA:
After a Decade of Delegation, the Time Is Ripe for Legislative Reform, 17 Omo N.U. L.
REV. 165, 176-82 (1990); G. Alan Perkins, Comment, Lender Liability Under CERCLA
Deserves Mare Than a Fleeting Glance, 13 U. ARK: LI'ITLE ROCK L.J. 209, 219-21 (1991).
See generally H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1 reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119 (legislative history of CERCLA); Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund")
Act of 1980, 8 COLU?i. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982).
25 See Grad, supra note 24, at 1.
26 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988).
___
'Z1 See id. § 9631 (1982) (provision establishing Superfund); id. § 9611 (1988) (current
provision regarding Superfund); see also Balcke, supra note 5, at 123.
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tional priority list" of the nation's worst hazardous waste sites.28
While Congress created the Superfund as a potential source of funds
for the remediation of hazardous waste sites, the EPA has sought
to finance the cleanup of the sites as much as possible through the
contributions of the parties who caused the contamination, the "potentially responsible parties" (PRPS).29
Under CERCLA, PRPs are liable for contamination that occurred
long before the enactment of the statute, even if they followed
commonly accepted, legal disposal methods at the time of disposal. 30
CERCLA did not set forth an explicit liability standard for PRPs,
but courts soon established that all the PRPs at a site were jointly
and severally liable for the entire cost of the cleanup, even if some
had made a minimal contribution to the contamination and others
were more responsible. 31 A PRP held liable for the entire cost of a
cleanup must bring its own contribution action against other PRPs,
some of whom may be bankrupt, unidentifiable, or dissolved. 32
In 1986, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(SARA)33 made a number of important changes to CERCLA. The
amendments established cleanup requirements,34 replenished the Superfund,35 formalized the EPA's settlement policies,36 enhanced state
and public participation in the site remediation process,37 and made
federal facilities subject to CERCLA.38 By providing elaborate
mechanisms for contribution in SARA, Congress in effect ratified
See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B) (1988); see also Balcke, supra note 5, at 123 n.5.
See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982);
see also Owen T. Smith, The Expansive Scope of Liable Parties Under CERCLA, 63 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 821, 821 (1989); Enfarcement Effort Has Been lne.fficient, May Cause Cleanup
Delay, Rand Report Finds, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 826, 826 (Sept. 15, 1989).
30 See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 174-75 (4th Cir. 1988), eert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co.,
810 F.2d 726,732-34 (8th Cir. 1986), eert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United States v. Hooker
Chems. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 556-57 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. Shell
Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1069-73 (D. Colo. 1985); see also Buckley, supra note 4, at 777-78.
31 See, e.g., Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 170-72; United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F.
Supp. 1249, 1252-57 (S.D. Ill. 1984); United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp. 572 F. Supp. 802,
806-07 (S.D. Ohio 1983); see also Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 24, at 708-09; Coven, supra
note 24, at 176-94.
32 See, e.g., United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 720 F. Supp. 1027, 1048 (D. Mass.
1989), aff'd, 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Coven, supra note 24, at 192-93.
33 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988».
34 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (1988).
35 Id. § 9611.
36 I d. § 9622.
37 See id. § 9605(a)(8)(B).
38 See id. § 9620; see also Balcke, supra note 5, at 133-34.
28

29
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court decisions that read a joint and several liability standard into
CERCLA: an action that suggests congressional intent to establish
a joint and several liability regime. 39 CERCLA was due for both
reauthorization and revision in 1991, but in 1990, Congress simply
reauthorized the existing statutory scheme until 1994. 40
CERCLA imposes liability for hazardous waste cleanups on four
categories of PRPS.41 First, the current owners and operators42 of a
"facility"43 from which there is a release or threatened release of any
substance statutorily identified as hazardous may be jointly and
severally liable for the release. 44 Second, past owners and operators
who owned or operated a facility when hazardous substances were
disposed of there may be still liable under CERCLA.45 Third, hazardous substance generators who arranged for disposal of their substances at any facility in the United States may be liable for the
entire cost of cleaning up that particular facility even though their

39 SARA does not explicitly endorse joint and several liability, but its legislative history
suggests that Congress approved of judicial use of this standard. See Richard H. Mays,
Settlements with SARA: A Comprehensive Review of Settlement Procedures Under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,101,
10,102 n.12 (Apr. 1987); Perkins, supra note 24, at 223 (citing 126 CONG. REC. S14,964 (daily
ed. Nov. 24, 1980».
40 Cleanup Program Extendedfor Three Years, Tax Authority for Four Years in Budget
Bill, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1243, 1243 (Nov. 2, 1990). The reauthorization was included at the
last minute in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, which Congress approvedon October
27, 1990. Id. Congress reauthorized the Superfund program without change until September
30, 1994 and the Superfund i~elf until December 31, 1995. Id. The new legislation funds the
program at a total funding level of $5.1 billion from October 1, 1991 to September 30, 1994.
[d. One reason that congressional leaders gave for simply reauthorizing CERCLA until 1994
was that it would be impossible for Congress to reauthorize both CERCLA and RCRA in the
same year. Id.
41 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
42 Id. § 9607(a)(1). The definition of "owner or operator" also includes an owner or operator
of a "vessel." Id.
43 Id. § 9601(9).
44 For a discussion of owner and operator liability, including relevant case law, see Smith,
supra note 29, at 824-3l.
45
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988). There is controversy reg-arding whether CERCLA
preempts state corporate dissolution laws, which generally provide for a two-year statute of
limitation. Compare United States V. Sharon Steel Corp., 681 F. Supp. 1492 (D. Utah 1987)
(CERCLA preempts state corporate dissolution laws) with Levin Metals Corp. V. ParrRichmond Terminal Co., 817 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (CERCLA does not preempt state
corporate dissolution laws) and Onan Corp. v. Industrial Steel Corp., 770 F. Supp. 490 (D.
Minn. 1989), aff'd, 909 F.2d 511 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 431 (1990) (CERCLA
does not preempt state corporate dissolution laws). See generally Audrey J. Anderson, Note,
Corporate Life After Death: CERCLA Preemption of State Corporate Dissolution Law, 88
MICH. L. REV. 131 (1989) (arguing that CERCLA preempts state corporate dissolution laws,
but only for corporations dissolved after CERCLA's enactment in 1980).
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contribution was small. 46 Finally, persons who transported hazardous
substances to a facility also may be liable. 47
Under CERCLA, PRPs have very limited defenses. A PRP has
the burden of establishing that the contamination resulted entirely
from an act of God, an act of war, or an act or omission of a third
party that has no contractual or other relevant relationship with the
PRP.48 In practice, these three defenses are of no use to most
PRPS.49 The so-called "innocent landowner" defense is available to
a current owner who conducted an appropriate environmental inquiry that reasonably failed to disclose the presence of hazardous
substances before the owner's purchase of the contaminated property.60 The PRP owner has the burden of establishing the innocent
landowner defense. 61
To mitigate some of the harshness in holding a PRP liable for the
entire cost of a cleanup where the PRP made only a minimal contribution to the contamination at a particular site, SARA authorizes
and to some extent encourages the EPA to reach settlements with
de minimis parties in any of the four statutory categories. 62 The
EPA has considerable discretion, however, in deciding who qualifies
as a de minimis party and in dictating the terms of settlement. 63
SARA also authorizes the EPA to enter into "mixed funding"
settlements, in which funds from both PRPs and the Superfund
finance remediation at a site. 64 The conference report accompanying
46 42 U.s.c. § 9607(a)(3) (1988); see also Smith, supra note 29, at 831-32. See generally
Jeffrey H. Howard & Linda E. Benfeild, CERCLA Liability jar Hazarcrous Waste "Generatars": Haw Far Does Liability Extend,'l, 9 TEMPLE ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 33 (1990).
47 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988); see also United States v. Western Processing Co., 756 F.
Supp. 1416, 1419-20 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (waste transporter's liability under CERCLA should
be restricted to situations where haulers select waste sites they use).
48 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988); see also Perkins, supra note 24, at 221-22 (discussing limited
nature of CERCLA defenses).
49 See Buckley, supra note 4, at 771-72; Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 24, at 707-09.
&l 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1988); see also Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 24, at 721-23. See
generally Eric Baumstark, Note, Innocent vs. Ignarant: When Is an Innocent Purchaser
Innocent Under CERCLA, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1319 (1990).
51 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1988); see also Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 24, at 721-23;
Baumstark, supra note 50, at 1321-22.
62 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)(B) (1988); Superfund Program; De Minimis Landowner Settlements, Prospective Purchaser Settlements, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235, 34,235-41 (1989); see also
Balcke, supra note 5, at 142-45. See generally Joel D. Newton, Note, The Innocent Too Shall
Pay: EPA's Settlement Policy Under CERCLAjar De Minimis Landawner Liability, 51 U.
PITT. L. REV. 727 (1990).
53 See Newton, supra note 52, at 743 (criticizing EPA for coercing persons with good
innocent landowner defenses into accepting de minimis settlements to avoid costs ofJitigation).
54 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b)(1) (1988).
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the 1986 amendments approved the use of the Superfund to provide
a portion of cleanup costs where bankrupt, unidentifiable, or dissolved PRPs had caused a substantial amount of the total contamination at the site and it would be unfair to require the remaining
PRPs to pay the entire cost of the cleanup;55 the report emphasized,
however, that the EPA should seek to shift the burdens of mixed
funding to nonsettlors. 56 The mixed funding provision does not address situations in which no viable PRPs exist to fund the cleanup
of an orphan site. 57
In addition, there is for secured creditors a statutory exemption
that excludes from the definition of "owner and operator" any person
who holds a security interest in a contaminated site but never has
participated in the management of that "facility."58 The interpretation of what constitutes management participation, however, has
created enormous controversy. As a result of this controversy, the
EPA in June 1991 proposed guidelines that may provide adequate
protection for lenders who seek to foreclose upon contaminated property.59 The secured creditor exemption affects many lenders that
~ H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., _2d Sess. 252 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3345; Balcke, supra note 5, at 136-38.
66
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 252 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3345.
67 A distinction should be made between orphan sites and orphan shares at a site where
some PRPs are still solvent and may be able to pay part or all of a cleanup. Compare Outboard
Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 610 F. Supp. 1234, 1238 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd, 773 F.2d 883 (7th Cir.
1985), judgment vacated, 479 U.S. 1002 (1986) ("CERCLA was designed to remedy hazardous
waste sites, specifically abandoned or 'orphan' dump sites.") (quoting United States v. Wade,
546 F. Supp. 785, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1982), appeal dismissed, 713 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1983» with
Balcke, supra note 5, at 149--51 (discussing orphan shares). The EPA applies its mixed funding
policy only where orphan shares exist. Balcke, supra note 5, at 136-38.
68 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). The statute excludes from CERCLA liability coverage
any "person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia
of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility." Id. Numerous
articles have addressed the issue oflender liability under CERCLA. See, e.g., Perkins, supra
note 24, at 226-47; see also infra note 59 and accompanying text. See generally Ann M.
Burkhart, Lender/Owners and CERCLA: Title and Liability, 25 HARv. J. LEGIS. 317 (1988);
Michele B. Corash & Lawrence Behrendt, Lender Liability Under CERCLA: Search for a
Safe Harbor, 43 Sw. L.J. 863 (1990); Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 24.
69 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender Liability
Under CERCLA, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300) (proposed
June 5, 1991).,In United States v. Fleet Factors, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit constructed the term ''management participation" to hold liable under CERCLA any secured creditor that "could affect hazardous waste decisions if it so chose." 901
F.2d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990), em. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991). Fleet Factors created
enormous concern in the lending community, whose intense lobbying subsequently led over
half the members of the United States House of Representatives to support legislation creating
greater protection for lenders. See Perkins, supra note 24, at 239; Creditors Who Follow
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have foreclosed upon or may have to foreclose upon contaminated
properties and therefore favor a liberal policy toward exempting the
prospective purchasers of such properties from CERCLA liability. 60
The federal government itself has an interest in the EPA's policy
toward these purchasers, because the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) and Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) have
acquired many banks that own contaminated property.61 The EPA
has proposed regulations that would exempt the FDIC and RTC
from liability, but has failed to provide special protection for parties
that subsequently buy property from these government entities. 62
Sound Practices Would be Exempt From Liability, Draft Says, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1891,
1891-92 (Feb. 22, 1991) (recounting furor over Fleet Factors decision and resulting proposed
legislation in Congress) [hereinafter Creditors].
In January 1991, the EPA sent to the federal Office of Management and Budget a revised
draft rule that contained greater protections for lenders. Proposed Draft Rule on Lender
Liability Under CERCLA with Accompanying Letter from EPA to OMB-Jan. 24, 1991,21
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1908 (Feb. 22, 1991); see also Carey S. Rosemarin, Lenders Still Face
Cleanup Issues Under Revised Liability Rules, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 25,1991, at 24-26; Creditor8,
supra, at 1891-92. On June 5, 1991, the EPA issued the proposed rule to protect banks, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC)
from liability. EPA Proposes Lender Liability Rule, Easing Fears of Financial Institutions,
22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 299, 299-300 (June 7, 1991). Commentators have debated whether this
proposed rule is too favorable or too restrictive. Compare Amy T. Phillips, EPA's Lender
Liability Rule: A Sweetheart Deal For Bankers?, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1158 (Aug. 23, 1991)
(arguing that proposed rule too lenient) with Philip R. Sellinger & Avery S. Chapman, EPA's
• Proposed Rule on Lender Liability Under CERCLA: No Panacea for the Financial Services
Industry, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,618 (Oct. 1991) (criticizing rule as too
restrictive).
so A recent study of the financial statements of major banks raises questions about whether
lenders are bearing as large a burden as they claim for the cleanup of hazardous waste sites.
Amy D. Marcus & Amy Stevens, Banks' Burden in Cleanups is Questioned, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 11, 1991, at B5. John Byrne, senior counsel to the American Bankers Association,
commented that the study did not reflect potential liability problems. Id. Many lenders will
not lend money to both high-risk industries and small businesses that use real estate as
collateral because of the uncertainties about the secured creditor exemption. I d.
61 See FDIC, Resolution Trust Corp. Seek Protection in Senate Bill Limiting Exp08ure
Under CERCLA, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 533, 534 (July 27, 1990). Steven Seelig, the director
of the FDIC's Division of Liquidation, estimated that the FDIC owned 270 contaminated
assets with a total book value of $365 million, and that the cost of cleaning up these properties
could exceed $1 billion. Id. The RTC is so concerned that CERCLA liability may discourage
private sector entities from managing RTC properties that it has added indemnity provisions
to its contracts; the provisions give extra protection to private sector managers, although the
managers still would be liable if they were grossly negligent. See RTC Adds CERCLA
Indemnity Provisions to Standard Asset Management Agreernent, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1806,
1806 (Feb. 8, 1991).
62 The FDIC and RTC support legislation to give additional protection to lenders. See
Perkins, supra note 24, at 212. The lender liability rule that the EPA proposed on June 5,
1991, however, does not address providing protections to prospective purchasers who buy
property from the FDIC, RTC, or other security holders. See Phillips, supra note 59, at 1159,
1162.

1991]

HAZARDOUS WASTE DUMPS

249

B. Problem Sites

1. Orphan Sites
The problem of "orphan" liability is looming large as the EPA
begins to focus its enforcement efforts on sites that were used as
wast.e disposal facilities for extended periods of time. 63 The primary
cause of this serious problem is the number of hazardous waste
facilities that have declared or are likely to declare bankruptcy.
Approximately seventy-four waste facilities had filed for bankruptcy
as of August 1985, and many more were expected to follow. 64 The
EPA currently estimates that between twenty-five and thirty percent of the companies owning land disposal facilities will petition for
bankruptcy over the next fifty years. 65 Bankrupt companies often
lack sufficient insurance or financial assets to pay for the typical
multimillion-dollar Superfund cleanup. 66
2. MSW Landfill Sites
Municipalities can be potentially 'liable under CERCLA.67 The
EPA, however, has treated municipalities differently from private
parties. In fact, in December 1989, the agency issued a policy statement aimed specifically at municipalities, the "Interim Policy on
CERCLA Settlements Involving Municipalities or Municipal
Wastes."68 The Policy exempts municipal waste generators that dispose of their wastes at privately owned mixed-use disposal sitessites that accept both MSW and hazardous waste-from liability
under CERCLA when the municipality's waste "is believed to come
from households, regardless of whether household hazardous waste
See Balcke, supra note 5, at 149-51.
Joseph L. Cosetti & Jeffrey M. Friedman, Midlantic National Bank, Kovacs and Penn
TelTa: The Bankruptcy Code and State Environmental Law-P&rceived Conflicts and Options
for the Trustee and State Environmental Agencies, 7 J.L. & COM. 65, 68 (1987); Comment,
A Congressicmal CJwice: The Question of Environmental Priority in Bankrupt Estates, 9
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 73, 77-78 (1990).
65 Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 64, at 68; Comment, supra note 64, at 78.
66 See Cosetti & Friedman, supra note 64, at 68; Comment, supra note 64, at 78. See
generally Steven W. Black, Comment, The Fact and Fiction of Financial Responsibility for
Hazardous Waste Management, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 581 (1990).
67 See Superfund Program; Interim Municipal Settlement Policy, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071, .
51,074 (1989); Washington, supra note 6, at 811-12. A state or local govermnent is not liable
if it merely acquires a site through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, or abandonment and has not
caused a release or threatened release on the property. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1988).
68 See Superfund Program; Interim Municipal Settlement Policy, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071,
51,073 (1989).
63
64
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may be present. "69 In other words, the EPA is not going to sue a
municipality because a citizen throws a can of roach or rodent killer
into the garbage.
As a matter of policy, the EPA will name a municipal generator
as a PRP only if there is site-specific evidence that the MSW from
the municipality contains hazardous substances from a commercial,
institutional, or industrial process or activity; or if there is an insignificant total volume of commercial, institutional, and industrial
waste from private contributors relative to the volume of householdderived waste that the municipality contributed. 70 The agency's voluntary policy of limiting its own CERCLA actions against municipalities except in specific circumstances does not change the fact that
the statute treats municipalities the same as any PRP. A private
party PRP can bring a contribution action against a municipality
under CERCLA ~regardless of whether the municipality is a generator or a MSW landfill owner/operator. 71 In addition, in contrast to
municipal generators, MSW landfill owner/operators are still "potentially liable just like private parties. "72
There has been considerable controversy about the extent to which
municipalities should be liable for the cleanup of household hazardous
waste that they collect from their residents. Home pesticides, cleaning agents, and other commonly used household toxics comprise
between 0.1% and 0.4% of the MSW waste stream.73 Some industrial
PRPs have argued in favor of the so-called "Delta Theory," which
proposes assessing liability on a volumetric basis. 74 These PRPs
maintain that, because industrial waste at mixed-use sites inevitably
contaminates ordinary household waste, they should not be responsible for household waste that has been commingled with industrial
Id. at 51,072 (emphasis added); see also Washington, supra note 6, at 812.
Superfund Program; Interim Municipal Settlement Policy, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071, 51,072
(1989); see also Washington, supra note 6, at 812.
71 See Superfund Program; Interim Municipal Settlement Policy, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071,
51,073-75 (1989); see also B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960, 974 (D. Conn. 1991)
(denying motion for summary judgment by several municipal generators because they were
potentially liable under CERCLA).
72 Superfund Program; Interim Municipal Settlement Policy, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071, 51,072
(1989); see also Washington, supra note 6, at 812-13.
'13 Compare B.F. Goodrich, 754 F. Supp. at 972 (expert testimony estimated that 0.3% to
0.4% of MSW is hazardous substances) with Ferrey, supra note 6, at 210 (hazardous waste
may constitute less than 0.1% of waste stream).
74 See Norman W. Bernstein, To Clean Up Landfills, the Leader Slwuld Be Municipalities
Using Economic Incentives to Settle, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,012, 10,013 (Jan.
1989).
69

70
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waste, and municipalities should bear a larger portion of cleanup
expenses. 75
A growing number of landfills, especially in the eastern United
States, are scheduled to close within the next few years, and there
is widespread agreement that United States citizens must reduce
the amount of waste they produce. 76 Municipalities are only beginning to address this problem. 77 Currently, the United States landfills
seventy-six percent of its waste, incillerates thirteen percent, and
recycles only eleven percent. 78 In 1988, the EPA set a national goal
of twenty-five percent source reduction and recycling by 1992,79 but
there has been disagreement about the extent to which recycling,
composting, and other source reduction methods can achieve or surpass this goal. 80 Some commentators have argued that households
must bear the cost of disposing of wastes in order to encourage
individuals to conserve resources, and have proposed volume or
toxicity taxes on household garbage. 81
Even if source reduction methods reduce the future flow of MSW,
however, many municipalities still may bear significant liability for
old MSW dumps.82 The th!:eat of CERCLA liability may increase
dramatically the cost of operating MSW landfills, which likely still
See Steinzor, supra note 6, at 123-26 (criticizing "Delta Theory").
See Washington, supra note 6, at 808; see also infra note 186 and accompanying text.
77 See Washington, supra note 6, at 808; see also infra note 186 and accompanying text.
78 See Peter S. Menell, Beyond the Throwaway Society: An Incentive Approach to Regulating Municipal Solid Waste, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 655, 664 (1990).
79 Id. at 658.
80 See, e.g., INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE, BEYOND 40 PERCENT: RECORDSETTING RECYCLING AND COMPOSTING PROGRMriS 57 (1990) (arguing that recycling and
composting can exceed EPA's 25% goal); THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 107-86 (John S. Bach & Lynn Hall eds., 1986).
81 See, e.g., Menell, supra note 78, at 687-95 (comparing curbside charges with other
solutions). One commentator advocates volume- and toxicity-based taxes. Washington, supra
note 6, at 823. According to this commentator, a municipality easily could measure volume by
the number of cans or bins designated for collection. [d. A toxicity tax might involve higher
transaction costs and raise privacy concerns because it would require inspections of individuals'
garbage cans. [d. at 823 n.133. Government searches of wastes set out for collection would
not violate the Fourth Amendment, California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988), but could
violate state constitutional provisions in two states. See State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274, 1277
(Haw. 1985) (Hawaii Constitution requires warrant for garbage searches); State y. Hempele,
576 A.2d 793, 814 (N.J. 1990) (New Jersey Constitution requires warrant for garbage left on
curb). Hempele's holding suggests that an administrative search warrant, as discussed in
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), might be sufficient for these searches.
Hempele, 576 A.2d at 813; Washington, supra note 6, at 823 n.133.
S2 See Steinzor, supra note 6, at 102-31 (municipalities face potentially large CERCLA
liabilities).
75
76
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will be necessary even if current source reduction efforts are successful. 83
C. Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Sites

In 1989, in response to numerous requests from private parties
interested in purchasing contaminated property, the EPA issued a
Policy Statement regarding the status of prospective purchasers of
contaminated property under CERCLA.84 The Policy Statement
made it clear that the EPA would not consider providing protection
from CERCLA liability to private parties that were engaged in real
estate transactions involving contaminated property unless the
agency thereby could avoid the expenditure of Superfund monies to
clean up the property in question. 85 The EPA recognized that it
would benefit if it could shift the cost of cleaning up an orphan site
to a private party that would be interested in developing the contaminated property after restoring it for reuse. 86 The agency therefore announced in the Policy Statement that a prospective purchaser
could participate in such a cleanup either by performing a substantial
response action itself or by paying the EPA a substantial sum toward
the cleanup. 87
The EPA voiced certain reservations in the Policy Statement
about providing protection from CERCLA liability to prospective
purchasers of contaminated property. Among the reasons for the
agency's cautiousness was its concern that other factors might outweigh any benefit that the government would receive in avoiding
the expenditure of monies from the Superfund. Because the EPA
has not conducted a remedial investigation/feasibility study (RIIFS)
or a PRP search at most NPL sites, it lacks important information
about the parties that may be responsible for the contamination at
a site, the extent of the contamination, and the appropriate remedy.88
Thus, the Policy Statement warned that, in many cases, the EPA
would not know whether a prospective purchaser safely could deB3 See Washington, supra note 6, at 817-24 (arguing that municipalities should bear cost of
remediating MSW landfills even though taxpayers may have to pay significant amounts and
CERCLA liability may discourage municipalities from collecting garbage).
84 Superfund Program; De Minimis Landowner Settlements, Prospective Purchaser Settlements, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235, 34,241-43 (1989).
as ld. at 34,241-42.
86 ld.
m ld. at 34,241.
88 ld. at 34,242-43.
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velop a property without interfering with the agency's cleanup
plan. 89
While the Policy Statement raised legitimate concerns, there are
solutions to some of the potential problems it foresaw. For example,
if the EPA lacks information about a particular site, a prospective
purchaser could perform the RIIFS instead of waiting for the EPA
to do it. There is evidence that private parties perform RIIFSs and
other remedial work more quickly and cheaply than the agency90a significant fact given that the average RIIFS currently takes
twenty-five months, and the entire cleanup process can last as long
as five years. 91 SARA allows partial settlements under which a PRP
may conduct a RIIFS without any agreement beforehand regarding
which parties shall perform the remainder of the cleanup.92 Prospective purchasers should have the same opportunity as PRPs to per-.
form RIIFSs if they desire to do so.
The Policy Statement also noted that the EPA may not know
whether any financially solvent PRPs exist at a site, and therefore
may not know whether the site is an orphan requiring the government to spend Superfund monies. 93 In preparing a RIIFS, a prospective purchaser could assist the agency in determining whether
PRPs exist that are financially capable of paying for a significant
portion of the cleanup at the particular site that the purchaser wants
Id. at 34,241.
Balcke, supra note 5, at 1~5. A 1990 study found that "costs at sites where the federal
government paid for the work jumped an average of 75 percent from the time planners decided
how a site should be cleaned up to the actual completion of the work. In sharp contrast, costs
for private sector cleanups increased an average of 15 percent." Cost oj Waste Cleanups
Underestimated, Especially if Federally Funded, Study Finds, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1485,
1485 (Nov. 30, 1990). The author of the study, Brett R. Schroeder of Independent Project
Analysis in Reston, Virginia, concluded that private industry is more efficient because of its
motive of profit maximization. Id. at 1486.
It is in.teresting to note that several business groups have sued the EPA over its decision
to prohibit private firms from conducting RIIFSs. Wade Lambert & Ellen J. Pollock, Former
Ashland Oil Chairman Gets 2 Years' Probation, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1990, at B8. The groups
contend that government RIIFSs would be more expensive, and cite a recent Senate Budget
Committee report showing that government contractors at Superfund sites spend from two
to five times as much as private companies for the same work. Id. On the other hand, the
EPA contends that privately conducted RIIFSs are frequently biased. Id.
9l See Balcke, supra note 5, at 128.
92 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1988); Balcke, supra note 5, at 138--40. The EPA, however, has
proposed to bar PRPs from performing risk assessments at Superfund sites in order to prevent
the possibility of biased assessments. Public Comment, Risk Assessment Policy Review Key
to Settlement Between EPA and Industry Groups, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1931,1931 (Dec. 6,
1991).
.
93 Superfund Program; De Minimis Landowner Settlements, Prospective Purchaser Settlements, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235, 34,241 (1989).
89
90
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to buy. For example, the prospective purchaser could hire an environmental consUlting firm to identify and locate PRPs rather than
relying on the EPA to perform these investigative tasks.
The EPA was deeply concerned about the safety risks inherent in
allowing a prospective purchaser to develop or utilize contaminated
land. 94 It implied in the Policy Statement that there is always a
possibility that the development or use of a former waste disposal
site may result in a release of hazardous substances. 95 In 1989,
however, the agency published a study showing that the environmental and human health risks from CERCLA sites are relatively
low; according to the study, statutory mandates and public opinion
have forced the government to treat these sites as a high priority
compared to the more substantial dangers that radon, indoor pollution, and pesticide residues pose. 96
It is noteworthy that the EPA in four cases has allowed a prospective purchaser to develop a contaminated orphan site based on
an agency determination that the safety risks were acceptable. 97
Furthermore, there actually may be a benefit in terms of safety if a
prospective purchaser can perform a RIIFS and cleanup faster than
the EPA. The greatest problem with the Superfund program has
been the slow pace at which the EPA has conducted cleanups, even
at sites on the NPL.98 Of course, the EPA should review carefully
94
95

Id.
See id. According to the Policy Statement,
. • . the listing of any site on the NPL means that there is a release or threatened
release of hazardous substances from the site. Development and commercial use of
such sites may pose a danger to those persons present at such sites, and the activities
to be carried out by the purchaser, even with the exercise of due care, may aggravate
or contribute to the contamination.

Id.
96 See U.S. ENVIRONlIIENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, COJIIPARING RISKS AND SETl'lNG
ENVIRONlllENTAL PRIORITIES: OVERVIEW OF THREE REGIONAL PROJECTS 62-65 (1989); see
also John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy,
and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUlli. L. REV. 261, 291 (1991) (reviewing EPA study);
Lester B. Lave, Risk Assessment and Regulatory Priorities, 14 COLUlli. J. ENVTL. L. 307,
309-11 (1989) (reaching same conclusion as EPA study).
f11 See infra notes 109-27 and accompanying text.
98 See Cleanup Funds Wasted on 'Transaction Costs,' CERCLA Needs Complete Overhaul,
ABA Panel Says, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 759, 759 (Aug. 10, 1990). J. Kent Holland, an attorney
from Virginia, told the audience at the American Bar Association's 1990 meeting that the
Superfund program was a failure because only 27 sites out of 1800 on the NPL had been
cleaned up. Id. EPA Administrator William K. Reilly has acknowledged that the program
must move at a faster pace, but EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement James Strock
defended the low number of cleanups on the grounds that SARA requires a five-year review
period for site remedies before the EPA can remove a site from the NPL. Id. Strock stated
that 400 Superfund sites are in the midst of long-term cleanups and an additional 200 sites
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any plans for developing a contaminated site, to ensure adequate
safety. The agency also should impose stringent financial responsibility requirements to guarantee that a prospective purchaser can
pay for remediation if an accidental release of hazardous substances
occurs. 99
The Policy Statement regarding prospective purchasers of contaminated property establishes an elaborate approval process that may
deter most of these potential purchasers. 100 Any purchase agreement
must satisfy the regional administrator in the particular EPA region
where the site is located, the agency's Assistant Administrators for
Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring and for Solid Waste and
Emergency Response in Washington, D.C., and the United States
Attorney General. 101 Perhaps a more serious obstacle for prospective
purchasers is the Policy Statement's failure to define clearly the
conditions with which a prospective purchaser must comply to obtain
approval. A modified approval process could protect the public while
producing more timely decisions. For example, a regional administrator could have the conditional authority to grant a covenant not
are undergoing short-term removal actions. Id. He added that, in 1989, there were 218
CERCLA settlements with an estimated value of more than $1 billion. Id. The EPA's inspector
general, however, has charged that the agency misled Congress in 1989 by claiming that it
had started 178 cleanups when it truly had begun work at only 150 sites; SARA required the
EPA to initiate 175 cleanups by October 17,1989. EPA Overstated 1989 Site Cleanup Count,
Misled Congress, Inspector General Finds, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 220, 220-21 (May 24, 1991).
On October 3, 1991, United States Senator Frank Lautenberg harshly criticized the EPA's
implementation of the Superfund program and charged that it still took the agency about 10
years to clean up a contaminated site, despite the agency's promise in 1989 that it would
speed up cleanups. Frank Lautenberg, Dingell Blast Superfund Studies; Reilly Focuses on
Accomplishments of Program, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1531, 1531 (Oct. 11, 1991). Reilly again
defended the EPA's handling of the Superfund program, but pledged to accelerate cleanups.
Id.
99 CERCLA already imposes financial responsibility requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 9608(a}-(b)
(1988). For a thorough discussion and criticism of the financial responsibility requirements
that RCRA imposes on hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities, see Black,
supra note 66, at 581-620. Congress probably should increase the financial responsibility
requirements for all entities involved with hazardous waste, not just for prospective purchasers. On July 1, 1991, however, the EPA proposed to amend its RCRA financial assurance
requirements to give large, financially sound institutions more flexibility in meeting the
agency's financial test criteria. 56 Fed. Reg. 30,201 (1991); see also Financial Test Criteria
for Facilities Would Be Amended Under EPA Proposed Rule, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 555, 555
(July 5, 1991). Whether this proposed rule is good policy is beyond the scope of this Article.
100 Superfund Program; De Minimis Landowner Settlements, Prospective Purchaser Settlements, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235, 34,243 (1989); see also Corash & Behrendt, supra note 58, at
883 (criticizing approval process on ground that time required is impractical for most real
estate transactions).
101 Superfund Program; De Minimis Landowner Settlements, Prospective Purchaser Settlements, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235, 34,243 (1989).
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to sue to a prospective purchaser with the proviso that such an
agreement must be published in the Federal Register, must be
subject to public comment, and may be vetoed within a limited period
by either a higher-ranking EPA official or by the United States
Department of Justice.
The Policy Statement also may discourage many prospective purchasers because it does not permit a prospective purchaser to assign
a covenant not to sue to a subsequent purchaser and therefore, as a
practical matter, restricts the alienability of th~ property.l02 Recently, however, the EPA for the first time signed an agreement
with a prospective purchaser to limit the potential cleanup liability
of a foreclosing bank and any subsequent purcliasers. l03 In May 1991,
the agency signed an agreement with Seafirst Bank, which was about
to foreclose on property linked to a Superfund site in Tacoma, Washington. 104 In the agreement, the EPA released the bank from future
CERCLA liability for contamination that other parties had caused,
in exchange for the bank's promise to clean up the foreclosed propertyand contribute $350,000 to clean up the Superfund site. l05 The
agreement protects all parties in the chain of title from the bank
provided that there is proper notice to the EPA.106 Its restrictions
and obligations "run with the land" and are binding on anyone acquiring an interest in the property.107 The agreement does not provide a release from liability, however, for natural resource damages
or for any releases the bank causes. 108
The EPA has provided a covenant not to sue to a prospective
purchaser of contaminated property on three other occasions, twice
to purchasers of bankrupt chemical companies. In both of these
cases, the purchaser agreed to remediate extensive contamination
that otherwise would have required multimillion-dollar expenditures
from the Superfund.
102 The Policy Statement, in its "Reservation of Rights" section, states that I/[t]he Agreement should expressly reserve the Agency's rights to assert all claims against the prospective
purchaser except for those set forth in the covenant not to sue." [d. at 34,242; see also Corash
& Behrendt, supra note 58, at 884 (discussing negative impact of provision on alienability of
property and stating that some EPA staff members have suggested to authors that EPA
would sue subsequent purchasers for pre-prospective purchaser environmental conditions).
103 EPA Will Not Hold Foreclosing Bank Liable After Bank Agreed to Pay Site Cleanup
Costs, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 126, 126 (May 17, 1991) (reporting In re BankAmerica Corp.,
U.S. EPA Region 10, No. 1090-11-16-101 (May 10, 1991».
104 [d.
lOS [d.
106 Id.
107 Id.
lOS Id.
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In 1987, before the EPA issued the Policy Statement on prospective purchasers, the agency and the state of Michigan entered into
a covenant with Phthalchem, Inc. in which the company was allowed
to operate a chemical plant in exchange for paying a bankruptcy
trustee $15 million toward remediation of the plant site. 109 Bofors
Nobel, Inc. (BNI) formerly had operated the chemical company.110
In September 1981, BNI and Michigan had entered into a consent
decree in which BNI agreed to remediate contamination on and off
the site at an estimated cost of between $12 million and $15 million. 111
BNI established Environmental Systems Corporation of Michigan
(ESCM) to own and operate a biological carbon treatment system to
remediate the site. 112 In 1985, BNI and ESCM filed for protection
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code; their decision to file for
bankruptcy was in part the result of their environmental liabilities. 113
During the reorganization proceedings, BNI and ESCM entered into
an agreement to sell a substantial portion of their assets to Phthalchern; however, the agreement conditioned the sale upon BNI and
ESCM obtaining a covenant not to sue for Phthalchem from the EPA
and Michigan. 114 The agreement between BNI and Phthalchem structured the sale so that BNI would retain title to the most heavily
contaminated portion of the real property, which contained sludge
lagoons and landfill areas, and transfer to Phthalchem title to that
portion of the property upon which the actual manufacturing operations took place.l15
The EPA and Michigan agreed to approve the complicated arrangements in the agreement and granted a covenant not to sue to
Phthalchem because, with the cash generated from the sale, BNI
and ESCM were able to pay $15 million for cleanup activities as part
of the distribution of estate assets.u6 Under the terms of the covenant, the EPA and Michigan had the right to enter the Phthalchem
property at any time to conduct cleanup actions, and there was no
109 See I. Leo Motiuk & Daniel J. Sheridan, Incentives and Protections Available to
Prospective Owners and Operators ofContaminated Property, 1990 A.B.A. SEC. REAL PROP.,
PROB. & TR. L. Tab B, at 9-13 (discussing Agreement and Covenant Not to Sue by and
Between the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the State of Michigan, Bofors Nobel,
Inc., Environmental Systems Corporation of Michigan, and Lomac, Inc. dated Mar. 25, 1987).
llO Id. at 10.
mId.
ll2 Id.
ll3 Id.
ll4 Id. at 10-11.
ll5 I d. at 11.
ll6 Id.
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protection for the company if any cleanup work interrupted its business operations. 117
In a third instance of the EPA providing a covenant not to sue to
a prospective purchaser of contaminated property, the agency in
1990 signed a covenant that approved the purchase by a Swedish
firm, Boliden AG, of the bankrupt Tennessee Chemical Company
(TCC).118 In the covenant, the EPA released Boliden from liability
for any contamination that occurred at the TCC site in Copperhill,
Tennessee, before Boliden began operating the chemical plant there
in March 1990. 119 In return, Boliden paid the agency $180,000 for
past response costs and agreed to spend over $8 million on environmental improvements that included reforesting the site, upgrading
. the plant's wastewater treatment system, and cleaning up contaminated SOil. 120 In September 1990, a federal bankruptcy court approved the agreement between Boliden and the EPA.121
Another covenant involved the unusual circumstances surrounding
the construction of a federally funded ski project within the boundaries of a Superfund site in Idaho. l22 The city of Kellogg, Idaho, had
obtained a $6A-million appropriation from the federal government
to finance the construction of forty-five per cent of a gondola transportation system connected with the Silverhorn ski area, Which the
city owned and operated. 123 The site of the proposed gondola system
was within the boundaries of the Bunker Hill Superfund site, an
area covering several square miles and involving several responsible
parties. l24 The city and other participants entered into a covenant
with the EPA that allowed the completion of the gondola system in

117

Id. at 12-13.

Tennessee Chemical Company Site Agreement and Covenant Not to Sue, 55 Fed. Reg.
52,887, 52,887 (1990). Earlier, the EPA had taken the interesting step of granting a limited
covenant not to sue to enable the Swedish firm to operate the chemical plant for four to six
months so that the company could evaluate the plant before making a purchase. See Swedish
Firm Released From Responsibility for Past Problems at Tennessee CERCLA Site, 20 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1944, 1944 (Apr. 6, 1990).
119 Tennessee Chemical Company Site Agreement and Covenant Not to Sue, 55 Fed. Reg.
52,887, 52,887 (1990).
118

Id.
EPA, Swedish Firm Reach Agreement on Sale of Bankrupt Firm in Tennessee, 21
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1128, 1128 (Oct. 5, 1990) (discussing In re Tennessee Chern. Co., No. 89·
120

121

01106 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Sept. 20, 1990».
122 See Corash & Behrendt, supra note 58, at 883 n.151 (discussing Agreement and Covenant
Not to Sue Re: Kellogg Gondola Project Located Within the Bunker Hill Superfund Site, U.S.
E.P.A. Region 10, No. 1089-07-01-122); Motiuk & Sheridan, supra note 109, at 14-15.
123 See Corash & Behrendt, supra note 58, at ~ n.1S1.
124

Id.
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exchange for the grading and encapsulating of contaminated soil at
the site. 125 The EPA did not comply with the strict procedures set
forth in its Policy Statement regarding prospective purchasers in
approving this covenant, because at the time the parties signed the
covenant, the RIfFS for the Bunker Hill Superfund site was only
partially complete. This agreement reveals that the agency is willing
to be flexible in the application of its own rules in order to expedite
the completion of a federally favored project.126
Such individual agreements to protect subsequent purchasers are
helpful. It would be more useful, however, for the EPA to establish
as a matter of policy that a subsequent purchaser who meets the
same safety and financial responsibility standards as the original
prospective purchaser may obtain a covenant not to sue, unless the
EPA can demonstrate a substantial reason for not providing one. 127
III. INCENTIVES FOR PRIVATE CLEANUPS

This Article now examines some proposals for using economic
incentives to encourage prospective purchasers to remediate orphan
sites, and suggests alternative approaches. It first is necessary to
ask why it is desirable to encourage private cleanups of orphan sites
rather than simply have the EPA conduct the cleanup of each site
and sell the remediated property.
A brief discussion of the EPA's strengths and weaknesses provides
a foundation for understanding the advantages of using economic
incentives to supplement the agency's functions. In general, the EPA
is a regulatory agency, not a public works agency, and does not have
the proper staffing to perform cleanups. The agency has recognized
that its inadequate staffing constrains its ability even to oversee
cleanups.128 Furthermore, there is evidence that the EPA is less
See id.
See Motiuk & Sheridan, supra note 109, at 15.
127 The Policy Statement does not constitute rulemaking by the EPA, and accordingly the
agency can treat a subsequent purchaser differently from the original prospective purchaser.
See Superfund Program; De Minimis Landowner Settlements, Prospective Purchaser Settlements, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235, 34,243 (1989). The EPA should promulgate the Policy Statement
as a formal rule, so prospective purchasers can have confidence that they will be able to sell
a site to a responsible buyer.
128 See Balcke, supra note 5, at 135 n.68; Longest Says Staff Slwrtages, Inexperience
Common in EPA's Superfund Cleanup Program, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 845, 845-46 (July 24,
1987). The United States Army Corps of Engineers manages many cleanups on the EPA's
behalf. Benjamin H. Grumbles & Kenneth J. Kopocis, Water Resources Acts: Developing an
Environmental Corps, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,308, 10,313 (June 1991).
J2S

126
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efficient than the private sector.l29 The agency suffers from high
staff turnover, poor communication among its personnel, and the
detrimental effects of intragovernmental rivalries. 130 While it would
be possible to solve some of the EPA's problems, one can make a
strong case for allowing the private sector, whenever possible, to
perform cleanups at orphan sites. Moreover, many of the arguments
about orphan sites apply equally well to municipalities that may be
liable for remediating an MSW landfill site. If the EPA is in a poor
position to conduct cleanups, one can imagine that many municipalities are similarly ill-equipped to perform remedial actions.

A. Auctioning Orphan Sites
Richard Stroup, an economics professor at Montana State University, has suggested that the federal government use Superfund
monies to pay a prospective purchaser to accept ownership of an
orphan waste site that has a negative value. 131 To accomplish this
end, he has proposed an innovative bidding system that involves
auctioning orphan waste sites to those private parties that can undertake a cleanup at a lower cost than the federal government. While
Stroup does not address the issue of MSW landfill liability, his
scheme could be adapted to allow municipalities to auction their old
landfills to EPA-approved private firms; the EPA probably would
want to hold the municipality ultimately responsible for any CERCLA liability. Stroup's basic plan, however, has some serious flaws.
According to Stroup, the potential purchaser making the lowest
cleanup cost bid, presumably after meeting minimum financial responsibility and safety requirements, would receive its bid amount
See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
See Joel A. Mintz, Economic Reform of Environmental Protection: A Brief Comment
on a Recent Debate, 15 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 149, 158-59 (1991).
131 See Stroup, supra note 12, at 872. There are similarities between Stroup's auction
proposal and the idea of auctioning marketable permits to emit pollution. See generally Bruce
A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case
for.Market Incentives, 13 COLUlIi. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 179-84 (1988). The 1990 Amendments
129

130

to the Clean Air Act have adopted a system of marketable permits to reduce emission of
sulfur dioxide, a major cause of acid rain. Clean Air Act §§ 401-416 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 7651-76510) (West Supp. 1991). Other commentators have discussed the use of market
incentives to either clean up existing hazardous waste sites or reduce waste generation, but
this Article focuses on Stroup's proposal because it is both simple and directly concerned with
the issue of whether the private sector can clean up orphan sites at less cost than the EPA
or the agency's contractors. See generally Robert W. Hahn, An Evaluation of Options far
Reducing Hazardous Waste, 12 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 201 (1988); Clifford S. Russell,
Economic Incentives in the Management of Hazardous Wastes, 13 COLUlIi. J. ENVTL. L. 257
(1988).
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from the EPA when the agency transfers title to the orphan site to
the bidder. 132 The new owner would be free to act as it wished, but
would be liable for any damages or threat of imminent danger that
it caused. Stroup fails to consider that it may be difficult to distinguish between present releases caused solely by past contamination
and present releases of past contamination caused by the purchaser's
activities or present releases of new hazardous waste that the purchaser brings to the site. The EPA would require the new owner to
post a bond as a guarantee that it would avoid such damage. The
bond, which would remain in the EPA's possession, would be large
enough to match the costs of responding to any danger that the
agency had determined the site could pose. The bond's income, over
and above the monies needed to ensure that it kept pace with inflation, would go to the new owner. The EPA would hold the bond
either until the completion of a successful cleanup or indefinitely, if
the remedy chosen was containment. All in all, according to Stroup,
his proposal would create incentives for biotechnology and other
firms to develop least-cost methods for cleaning up abandoned hazardous waste sites. 133
Highly critical of government cleanup efforts because of their
inefficient use of time and money, Stroup maintains that his proposed
bidding system would "supplant the [S]uperfund program. "134 His
proposal, however, ignores the reality that the EPA would have to
monitor carefully the safety of any cleanup or containment plan.
Stroup claims that his proposal eliminates the need for political or
bureaucratic approval of decisions regarding how much funding is
necessary to cleanup a contaminated site. l35 The EPA, however, still
would have to determine whether containment is a sufficient remedy
at each site, whether contractors should remove contaminated materials and send them to a secure disposal facility,136 or whether a
132 Id. Because an orphan site has no solvent or identifiable owners, Stroup apparently
assumes that the EPA or ~other government agency has title to the site, and that no former
owner would contest title to the property.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 The remediation of a hazardous waste site can involve either "in situ," or in'-place,
treatment or disposal, with the installment of a cap or cover and long-term continued monitoring and maintenance; or "clean closure," which requires the removal of the wastes and
waste residues for disposal elsewhere. See Elizabeth U. Natter, Haw Clean Is Clean? Hazardous Waste/Hazardous Substance Cleanup Standards Under Kentucky Law: An Overview,
18 N. Ky. L. REV. 295, 296 (1990) (contrasting in situ cleanup with clean closure); see also
Delogu, supra note 3, at 203 n.17. CERCLA's definitional section distinguishes between

262

ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS

[Vol. 19:239

remedial plan for permanent treatment of the hazardous wastes is
necessary. SARA established a preference for remedial actions that
permanently reduce the volume, toxicity, or mobility of hazardous
substances. Stroup's proposal therefore is inconsistent with congressional intent to the extent that it allows a purchaser to choose
containment rather than treatment without a prior determination by
the EPA that containment is the best approach for the purchaser's
site. 137
Furthermore, Stroup's proposal itself would require the EPA, at
every site, to estimate both the cost of cleanup and the risk posed
by the contamination as a prerequisite for setting the amount of the
bond. Stroup does not explain what would happen if the EPA later
determined that the cost of remediation was far higher than first
anticipated, or concluded that the initial cleanup plan was inadequate. In addition, what happens if the purchaser or the issuer of
the bond files for bankruptcy? Finally, the prospect of paying firms
Superfund monies without any government supervision is unacceptable in our political system, which requires regulatory agencies such
as the EPA to justify its decisions to Congress, the White House,
and ultimately to the American people. 138

B. Tax Incentives
Kathleen Martin, a practicing attorney in Minnesota, has proposed
creating for prospective purchasers of contaminated property a
cleanup tax credit that would be similar to the low-income housing
credit provided in section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code)
and the rehabilitation tax credit provided in section 48 of the Code. 139
permanent remedial actions and short-term removal actions designed to prevent the immediate
threat of hazardous substance releases. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23), (24) (1988).
137 In SARA, Congress made it clear that permanent remedial solutions are preferred over
other options. 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (1988). In some cases, however, the EPA has recognized that
it may be too difficult and expensive to achieve permanent treatment. See infra note 256 and
accompanying text.
.
138 This Article does not mean to imply that market incentives are inherently at odds with
our democratic traditions. Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart have argued that markets
can be designed in ways that enhance democracy. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 131, at
171. Unlike Stroup, Ackerman and Stewart recognize that the EPA would playa significant
role in setting goals for and monitoring any system such as a marketable permit system. See
id. at 183-88.
139 Martin, supra note 12, at 7. For a discussion of the low-income housing tax credit under
I.R.C. § 42, see infra note 143 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the rehabilitation
tax credit under I.R.C. § 48, see Carolyn E. Cheverine & Charlotte M. Hayes, Note, ReluLbilitation Tax Credit: Does it Still Provide Incentives?, 10 VA. TAX REV. 167 (1990).
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Under her scheme, this credit could be based upon the costs that a
private party incurs in cleaning up a site and claimed in the year of
expenditure. 140
A purchaser of a contaminated site would have to fulfill several
conditions in order to receive a cleanup tax credit, according to
Martin. The taxpayer-purchaser would have to show that it would
not have cleaned up the site without the benefit of the tax credit,
and that as a result of its cleanup efforts, the EPA has granted the
taxpayer-purchaser a covenant not to sue: evidence that the cleanup
avoided the use of Superfund monies. 141 In addition, the taxpayerpurchaser would have to prove that it performed an environmental
audit; that federal and state environmental authorities approved the
audit; that the taxpayer-purchaser cleaned up the site according to
a government-approved remedial plan; and that the amount of the
claimed credit corresponds to the amount of cleanup costs incurred. l42 While Martin did not address MSW liability, there is no
reason that her plan could not be modified to include private parties
that purchase an MSW landfill.
It is worth noting that section 42 is controversial, with critics
charging that it provides more benefits to the wealthy than lowincome housing. 143 Moreover, tax credits are rarer than tax deductions within the Code, because credits provide a dollar-for-dollar tax
savings to the taxpayer while deductions reduce the taxpayer's tax
liability only according to the taxpayer's marginal tax rate. Under
current law, each deductible dollar generally would provide at most
a thirty-four percent savings to a corporate taxpayer and a thirtyone percent tax savings to an individual taxpayer.l44 In the current
fiscal climate, with huge federal budget deficits, it seems unlikely
that Congress will enact tax credits for prospective purchasers. 145
See Martin, supra note 12, at 7.
Id. at 7-8.
142 Id. at 8.
143 See generally Janet Stearns, Comment, The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit: A Poor
Solution to the Housing Crisis, 6 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 203 (1988); Dino Fusco, Note, The
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit: An Incentivefor Owners of Low-Income Housing Units to
Delay the Maintenance of Their Units, 43 TAX LAW. 969 (1990).
140
141

144 Section 1 of the Code establishes a 31% marginal rate for the highest-earning individual
taxpayers, and § 11 of the Code sets a 34% marginal tax rate for the highest-earning corporate
taxpayers. I.R.C. §§ 1, 11 (1988). In some circumstances, the marginal rate on an individual
or corporate taxpayer may be higher than these stated rates. For example, under § 151(d)(3),
the Code reduces the benefit of personal exemptions for high-income individuals. Id.
§ 151(d)(3).
145 In April 1991, Representative Dan Rostenkowski, chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee, urged Congress to allow a dozen popular tax breaks, including the low-
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In addition, in the context of hazardous waste site remediation, a
full dollar-for-dollar tax credit may not be efficient, because it would
provide no incentives for minimizing costs. Moreover, there is the
problem of fraud-a prospective purchaser may pad its costs in order
to collect a larger credit. Because of the complexities in determining
the size of the credit and policing fraud, there probably would be
high transaction costs associated with administering a tax credit
program.
If tax credits are too generous for prospective purchasers, should
their costs in buying and cleaning up contaminated property be
deductible? This option raises the question of the extent to which
CERCLA cleanup costs are deductible under the current Internal
Revenue Code. Although there are few cases regarding the tax
implications of CERCLA, the issue is becoming more important as
the number of penalties and payments under the statute continues
to groW.146
To answer this question, it is useful to begin by drawing an analogy
between deducting expenses for waste site cleanups and deducting
payments of natural resources damages to the government. CERincome housing credit, to lapse on December 31, 1991, for a savings of more than $2 billion.
Jackie Calmes, Rostenkowski Urges Congress to Allow a Dozen Popular Tax Breaks to Lapse,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1991, atA2, col. 2. Rostenkowski, citing the "pay-as-you-go" agreement
in the 1990 budget agreement, stated that committee members will have to come up with
offsetting tax increases or spending cuts to pay for each expiring tax break. Id. On October
9, 1991, he appeared more willing to compromise on the possibility of extending these tax
credits and stated, "I'm for the extensions if somebody will show me how to pay for them."
The $1.7 Billion Question: What About Expiring Provisions?, 53 TAX NOTES 134, 134 (Oct.
14, 1991). Several lobbyists have speculated about how Congress might keep these tax credits,
but the fate of these credits remains uncertain. Id.
146 See Thomas H. Steele, Tax Consequences Associated with the Ownership and CleanUp of Environmentally Damaged Properties, 1989 A.B.A. SEC. REAL PROP., PROB. & TR.
L. 1 ("Very little legal authority or commentary currently exists regarding the tax consequences of the ownership and clean-up of environmentally damaged properties."). See generally Sloane E. "Anders, Note, The Federal Tax System and the Environment: Should Payments Made Pursuant to CERCLA Be Deductible?, 10 VA. TAX REV. 707 (1991). This author
could find no federal decisions, and only one state decision, dealing with the tax consequences
of remediating contaminated property. In Inmar Assocs., Inc. v. Borough of Carlstadt, the
New Jersey Supreme Court held that it would not determine the value of polluted land for
tax assessment purposes simply by deducting the amount of estimated cleanup costs from the
value of unpolluted land. See 549 A.2d 38 (N.J. 1988). The court reasoned that the costs of
cleanup were analogous to deferred maintenance, because the owners could have spent more
money to reduce the amount of contamination but instead had deferred the cost of cleanup
until the present time. Id. at 42-43. While the court did not provide a definitive approach, it
suggested in dicta that the costs of remediating contaminated property be treated as a capital
improvement to be depreciated over the beneficial life of the property. I d. at 45. The case did
not involve a prospective purchaser that was seeking to remediate property it had no role in
contaminating.
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CLA provides that responsible parties are potentially liable for hazardous substance releases that injure or destroy natural resources. 147
It is unclear whether payments of natural resources damages are
deductible under the Code. 148 Code section 162(a) allows a deduction
for "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during
the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business," but section
162(f) disallows any deduction for fines and penalties paid to government entities. 149 According to one commentator, payments for
natural resources damages under CERCLA should not be construed
as nondeductible fines or penalties under section 162(f).150 She argued that the cleanup costs a business incurs differ from fines or
penalties in that businesses do not pay cleanup costs to the government except to reimburse the government for its cleanup expen42 u.s.c. § 9607(a) (1988); see also Anders, supra note 146, at 710-11.
See Anders, supra note 146, at 712-21.
149 1. R. C. § 162(a), (f) (1988).
160 See Anders, supra note 146, at 712-21. The commentator conceded that the analogous
case law under other environmental statutes is far from clear. Id.; see, e.g., True v. United
States, 894 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990) (civil penalties under Federal Water Pollution Control
Act for oil leaks are nondeductible); Colt Indus. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1311 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (fines imposed under Clean Water Act (CWA) and Clean Air Act (CAA) are nondeductible); see also Rev. Rul. 88-46, 1988-1 C.B. 76, 77 (IRS held that nonconformance penalty
assessed by EPA against manufacturer of truck engines for failure to comply with CAA
§ 206(g)(1) was deductible under 1.R.C. § 162); Evan Slavitt, An Overview oj the Tax Implications oj Environmental Litigation, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,547, 10,548-52
(Dec. 1990).
A full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is worth noting that
Congress might intervene if a court were to hold that payments of natural resources damages
are tax-deductible. For example, public furor over reports that Exxon could deduct its costs
in cleaning up the Alaska oil spill has generated several proposed bills in Congress to disallow
deductions for costs connected to oil and hazardous substance cleanup. See Steele, supra note
146, at 1, 16, 24-32 (discussing S. 771, H.R. 1935, and H.R. 2060).
A congressional study determined that the originally proposed settlement of the Exxon
Valdez case would cost Exxon less than half of the $1.1 billion agreed upon in criminal and
civil penalties, because the company would be able to deduct the civil penalties from its income
taxes; only the originally proposed $100-million criminal fine would have been nondeductible.
Deductions Limit Exxon's Settlement Costs to About $500 Million, Hill Researchers Say, 21
Env't Rep. (BNA) 2083, 2083-84 (Mar. 22, 1991). A federal judge rejected the first proposed
criminal plea bargain that was the basis of the settlement on the grounds that it was too
lenient. Allanna Sullivan, Federal, State O.fjicials Look to Salvage Exxon Plea Bargain
Rejected by Judge, WAIL. ST. J., Apr. 26,1991, at A3, col. 2. Exxon since has agreed to pay
an additional $25 million in criminal fines, for a total of $125 million in criminal penalties, and
a federal judge has accepted the plea agreement, ending two years of litigation. See Federal
Judge Accepts $1 Billion Settlement, Ends Two-Year Litigation in Exxon Oil Spill, 22 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1533, 153~ (Oct. 11, 1991) (Exxon actually paid $250 million in criminal fines
and restitution, but Justice Department forgave $125 million of that total); see also Exxon
Agrees to Pay $1.125 Billion to Settle Litigation Over Valdez Spill, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA)
1403, 1403-04 (Oct. 4, 1991).
147

148
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ses. 151 Thus, section 162(f),s bar on deductions for fines and penalties
should not apply to cleanup expenses, because unlike payments of
natural resources damages made under CERCLA, cleanup expenses
are not "fines or penalties. "152
Commentators have agreed that it is difficult to determine
whether cleanup expenditures under CERCLA are deductible as
ordinary and necessary business expenses under Code section 162(a)
or whether they must be capitalized. 153 To be deductible under section 162(a), a business expense must be both "ordinary" and "necessary;" however, section 263 limits the scope of section 162 by
prohibiting a deduction for "[a]ny amount paid out for new buildings
or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase
the value of any property or estate."I54 The purpose of sections 162
and 263 is to prevent taxpayers from deducting in one tax year
amounts paid to a~quire assets that will remain useful for more than
one year. 155 If one regards cleanup costs as improving, altering, or
increasing the value of a parcel of uncontaminated property, then
these costs should be capitalized; if, however, one views these expenditures as merely correcting a defect in the property-neither
increasing nor improving the property's life-or adapting the property for a different use, then they should be deductible as ordinary
and necessary business expenses. 156 Even the one commentator who
has argued that cleanup expenses should be deductible has acknowledged that there is no clear line distinguishing capital expenditures
from currently deductible business expenses. 157
Requiring a purchaser of contaminated property to capitalize its
cleanup expenses rather than currently deduct them results in significant tax disadvantages for the taxpayer-purchaser. If the costs
of investigation and cleanup are considered capital expenditures, the
taxpayer-purchaser must add these costs to its basis in the property.l58 Because the taxpayer-purchaser makes such expenditures to
clean up land that has no measurable useful life, these monies may
See Anders, supra note 146, at 721.
ld.
153 Compare Steele, supra note 146, at 11-12 (suggesting cleanup expenditures may have
to be capitalized) with Anders, supra note 146, at 707-30 (cleanup expenditures probably can
be deducted, although good case can be made for capitalization).
154 I.R.C. §§ 162(a), 263(a)(I) (1988); see also Steele, supra note 146, at 8-13 (discussing
I.R.C. §§ 162 and 263); Anders, supra note 146, at 721-29 (discussing §§ 162 and 263).
155 See Anders, supra note 146, at 722.
166 ld.
157 See id. at 729.
158 See Steele, supra note 146, at 11.
151

162
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not qualify for a deduction through depreciation or amortization. 159
Instead, they may provide a tax benefit, if at all, only upon the sale
of the property. 160
Depending upon whether cleanup expenses are deductible or must
be capitalized, the current tax system may not encourage prospective purchasers seriously to consider buying and remediating contaminated properties. 161 One solution would be to allow the prospective purchaser of a contaminated site, but not any of the parties
responsible for contamination, to deduct the cleanup costs it incurs
in each tax year. Another possibility is to allow a prospective purchaser to rapidly amortize its cleanup costs. Section 169 of the Code
allows taxpayers that own certain certified water or air pollution
control facilities to amortize their costs over a period of sixty
169 See id. House Ways and Means Committee Chainnan Dan Rostenkowski has proposed
to change the tax treatment of intangibles by establishing a 14-year amortization period.
'Winners and Losers' in Rosty's Intangibles Bill, 52 TAX NOTES 982, 982 (Aug. 26, 1991). It
is unclear what impact this bill, H.R. 3035, would have upon cleanup deductions.
It is also worth noting that I.R.C. § 468, which provides a current deduction for the costs
of reclaiming waste sites and closing mines, specifically excludes any waste site that the
taxpayer disturbs after the EPA has listed the site on the NPL. I.R.C. § 468(d)(2)(B)(ii)
(1988); see also Richard A. Westin & Sanford E. Gaines, The Relationship of Federal Income
Taxes to Toxic Wastes: A Selective Study, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 753, 782 (1989)
("This exclusion has the effect of barring a current deduction for response or remediation
costs required under the Superfund program for NPL sites ..."). Congress did not address,
however, whether a prospective purchaser or other person who had no role in creating
hazardous contamination ought to benefit from § 468.
Another issue, beyond the scope of this Article, is the timing of CERCLA deductions for
"accrual basis" taxpayers. Where several PRPs enter into a settlement under the terms of
which they pay money into an escrow account or other trust fund for remediation purposes,
they may not spend these monies for a lengthy amount of time. Therefore, questions arise as
to when the obligation has "accrued," and when economic performance has occurred as the
result of payment being made. See Mark W. March & Julia K. Brazelton, Supeifund Cleanups:
The Financial Costs High, the Tax Treatment Uncertain, 69 TAXES 682, 682-88 (1991)
(arguing that PRP paying EPA for cost of cleaning up Superfund site should be able to deduct
that payment as business expense because economic performance has occurred when taxpayer
pays EPA, and because Superfund liabilities are payment liabilities under proposed regulations
for I.R.C. § 461); Slavitt, supra note 150, at 10,553-54. See generally Thomas H. Yancey,
Proposed Regulations Under the Internal Revenue Code Affect the Time of Deduction for
SupeifundCleanup Costs, 21 CHEM. WASTE LITlG. REP. 573 (Mar. 1991) (discussing proposed
treasury regulations to I.R.C. § 461 found at 55 Fed. Reg. 23,235 (1990), and arguing that
economic performance occurs when payment is made to special settlement funds). In general,
under either I.R.C. § 461 or § 468B, payments must be irrevocable and under the control of
someone other than the taxpayer for economic performance to occur. A settling PRP, however,
is often either a trustee of the cleanup trust fund or a PRP committee member with the power
to give directions to the trustees. Slavitt, supra note 150, at 10,554. Still another problem is
that settling PRPs often retain reversionary rights in any funds remaining after the cleanup.
Id.
ISO See Steele, supra note 146, at 11-12.
161 See supra notes 100-17 and accompanying text.
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months. 162 A short amortization period would encourage prospective
purchasers, because under the current tax code, there are relatively
long amortization periods for most capital expenditures. l63
Accordingly, a direct deduction or rapid amortization would pro·
vide greater incentives for efficiency than would a dollar·for-dollar
tax credit, because prospective purchasers of contaminated property
would bear part of the costs of remediation and therefore seek to
minimize those costs. There is still, however, the problem of the
transaction costs involved in policing by the EPA or Internal Rev·
enue Service (IRS) against tax fraud. Moreover, the prospects of
getting Congress and the president to approve either a deduction or
rapid amortization proposal are slim in the near future.

C. Impact and Linkage Fees
Martin has proposed the use of impact or linkage fees on new
commercial development to fund cleanups of contaminated prop·
erty.l64 In essence, she proposes that a developer pay an "exaction,"
or contribution, to a municipality as a condition of building its proj·
ect. 165 The most common and least controversial type of exaction is
a municipal requirement that a developer "dedicate" land within its
development for streets, sidewalks, water and sewer lines, parks,
or schools. 166 In those circumstances in which a developer lacks land
suitable for dedication, a municipality may require the developer to
pay a fee in lieu of dedication, to accomplish the same purpose. A
municipal ordinance could limit the use of such fees to the acquisition
of a park or construction of a school that primarily, although not
exclusively, will benefit the residents of the new development. 167
Martin's proposal, however, is not concerned with these two types
of exactions, which courts usually uphold as reasonable exercises of
the police power regarding land use regulation. She focuses on two
more controversial types of exaction: "impact" fees and "linkage"
163 I.R.C. § 169 (1988). For example, § 169 is restricted to plants that were in operation
before January 1, 1976: a policy that is counterproductive in that it does not provide an
incentive to build more expensive facilities that may exceed current standards. See Westin &
Gaines, supra note 159, at 767-72.
163 See Westin & Gaines, supra note 159, at 770 (explaining that despite its limitations,
I.R.C. § 169 provides for more rapid amortization than most other forms of capital expenditures pursuant to 1986 Tax Reform Act).
164 Martin, supra note 12, at 9-10.
165 See Donald L. Connors & Michael E. High, The Expanding Circle oj Exactions: From
Dedication to Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 70 (1987) (defining "exaction").
166 Id.
167 Id. at 71.
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fees. 1GB In some cases, the improvement of a municipality's capital
infrastructure is necessary to accommodate the new residents of a
developer's project as well as continue to serve existing residents
who live beyond the boundaries of the developer's project. 169 For
example, the municipality may need to improve its water treatment
or road system to accommodate problems resulting from growth in
the community. If that municipality lacks sufficient revenues to fund
such improvements, it may impose an impaGt fee on the developer
in order to fund the improvements. 170 Courts are more likely to
uphold an impact fee if the municipality can establish a proportionate
relationship between the amount a developer must pay and the
extent to which its project increases the cost of the municipal infrastructure. 171
Boston and San Francisco have developed linkage fee programs
that require a developer of commercial office space to construct lowand moderate-income housing on the theory that the construction of
new office space generates a need for housing.172 Courts may question the constitutional appropriateness of linkage fees because such
fees primarily accomplish social goals that are beyond a developer's
direct costs. In addition, courts may balk because the imposition of
these fees compels a developer to construct private facilities,
whereas the first three types of exactions require the building of
public facilities. 173
Martin proposes that municipalities impose an impact or linkage
fee-type requirement on commercial developers, requiring a developer to clean up a hazardous waste site in the municipality even if
the developer's project has no relationship to the site or to hazardous
waste. 174 If a community can demonstrate a link between a commercial development and the cleanup of a particular site, according to
Martin, it may be appropriate for the community to impose a remedial linkage fee on the development. 175 For example, if the development requires housing, and only contaminated property is
168 See id. at 70-72 (contrasting land dedications and in-lieu fees, which are widely accepted,
with impact and linkage fees, which are more controversial).
'
169 Id. at 71-72.

Id.
Id. at 72.
172 See id.; R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision ImprovfmWnt RequirfmWnts to Community
Beneji;tAssessmentsandLinkagePayments:ABriefHistoryofLandDevelopmentExactions,
50 LAW & CONTEIIfi>. PROBS. 5, 25 (1987).
173 See Connors & High, supra note 165, at 72.
174 See Martin, supra note 12, at 9-10.
175 Id. at 9.
170

171
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available upon which to build that needed housing, then it could be
proper to require the developer to acquire and clean up the contaminated property for housing as a condition for going forward with its
development. 176 Moreover, the same linkage could apply to parks,
schools, fire stations, and other public facilities if only contaminated
land was available for their siting.177 Martin did not discuss the issue
of MSW landfill liability, but her linkage strategy could be adapted
to require a developer either to remediate an old MSW landfill or to
build a new MSW disposal facility if the new industrial or commercial
development will generate significant amounts of MSW.
Martin acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission178 raises questions about the required "nexus" between exactions and the public
purpose. 179 In N ollan, the California Coastal Commission had conditioned approval of a building permit for construction on beachfront
property upon the property owner's grant of an easement providing
lateral access to the ocean. l80 The Court concluded that there was
no "essential nexus" between the exaction and the state's purpose
of increasing visual access to the beach, and therefore held that the
condition effected an unconstitutional taking. 181 Martin argued that
Nollan is more likely to affect land dedications than impact fees, but
conceded that a court would scrutinize the nexus between the need
for a particular development project and any exaction to pay for
cleanup costs. 182
The problem with Martin's argument in favor of linkage and impact
fees is the difficulty a municipality faces in proving that an essential
nexus exists between a proposed development and the remediation
of a contaminated site when the developer does not plan to use the

ld. at 9-10.
ld.
178 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
179 Martin, supra note 12, at 10. A number of commentators have examined the nexus test
set forth in Nollan. See, e.g., Peter F. Neronha, Note, A Constitutional Standard oj Review
Jor Permit Conditions, Exactions and Linkage Programs: Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 30 B.C. L. REV. 903, 933-34 (1989) (under Nollan, there must be clear link between
exaction and developer's project); see also inJra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
180 483 U.S. at 828; see also Steven J. Lemon et al., Comment, The First Applications oj
the Nollan Nexus Test: Observations and Comments, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 585, 602-04
176

177

(1989).
181 483 U.S. at 838--89.
182 Martin, supra note 12, at 10. How courts will apply the Nollan nexus test in the context
of other types of municipal linkage and exaction fees remains uncertain, so Martin's argument
is as good as any until the courts, and especially the Supreme Court, clarify this issue.
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site itself for the development. l83 It is highly possible for courts to
find that N olla11r-and even prior cases sanctioning exactions, for
example, for low-income housing-does not support linkage between
commercial development and the cleanup of a contaminated site
unless the developer plans to build on the contaminated site itself,
or the contaminated site is the only possible location for a needed
public facility.l84 For example, San Francisco requires developers
who wish to build on the city's eastern waterfront to perform soil
tests and clean up a site, if necessary, to obtain a builder's permit. l85
This type of linkage is clearly appropriate to prevent the spread of
contamination to other sites as the result of proposed development.
While contamination of industrial and commercial property is a serious and widespread problem, however, it is unlikely that the only
site in an entire municipality for low-income housing or a school
would be a contaminated site.
Even if courts endorse Martin's approach, it may not be wise from
a policy standpoint, because the type of linkage fee that Martin
proposes may involve high transaction costs. Developers are likely
to litigate attempts at linking their projects with the cleanup of
hazardous waste sites, and such litigation could be very costly to
municipalities, whether they win or lose. Furthermore, Martin's
linkage scheme does not address the problem of building new hazardous and solid waste disposal facilities at a time when there is a
serious shortage of places to dispose of both hazardous and solid
waste. l86 In section V, this Article argues that it makes more sense
in terms of linkage to have developers of waste disposal facilities,
who presumably have expertise in this area, to remediate and reuse
orphan and landfill MSW sites.
This Article has examined three types of economic incentives that
could involve developers in cleaning up contaminated property.
183 See generally Robert Collin & Michael Lytton, Linkage: An Evaluation and Exploration, 21 URB. LAW. 413 (1989) (discussing Boston and San Francisco linkage requirements
and their fate in light of Nollan); Theodore C. Taub, Exactions, Linkages, and Regulatory
Takings: The Developer's Perspective, 20 URB. LAW. 515 (1988).
184 See generally supra notes 164-83 and accompanying text.
185 Michael F. Reilly, Transformation at Work: The Effect of Environmental Law on Land
Use Control, 24 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 33, 72-73 (1989).
188 See, e.g., Phillip A. Davis, Reautlwrization Is New Front for the Garbage Wars, 49
CONGo Q., 979, 979-80 (1991) (congressional efforts to reauthorize RCRA stymied by state
efforts to bar hazardous and solid wastes); Bradford C. Mank, Out-aI-State Trash: Solid Waste
and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 38 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 25, 25 n.1 (1990);
Rose Gutfeld, As Eastern Landfills Reach Capacity, States Send Garbage West, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 26, 1991, at AI, col. 1 (discussing solid waste crisis); see also infra notes 187-90 and
accompanying text.
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Stroup's auction system, cleanup tax credits, and tax deductions for
cleanup expenditures all could encourage a private party to purchase, remediate, and develop a contaminated orphan or MSW landfill site. On the other hand, Martin's exactions proposal would force
developers of commercial property to assist municipalities in cleaning
up contaminated sites. In section IV, this Article discusses whether
mediation and arbitration techniques can facilitate good decisions
regarding the siting of waste disposal facilities. While disposal facility siting and waste site cleanup are seemingly unrelated, this Article
contends that a potential "host" community and a developer of a
proposed waste disposal facility should negotiate over whether the
developer may clean up a contaminated site in the municipality as
partial compensation for the opportunity to build its facility.
IV. SITING AND NEGOTIATED COMPENSATION: EXISTING
SCHEMES

In recent years, it has become increasingly difficult to site certain
types of projects such as airports, prisons, highways, MSW landfills
and hazardous waste disposal facilities. 187 A phenomenon popUlarly
known as the "NIMBY syndrome" is one of the major causes of these
difficulties. ISS After Love Canal, Times Beach, and Three Mile Island, the public generally has less confidence in the ability of scientific experts and government bureaucrats to manage technological
risk. 189 Subsequently, while there is a growing shortage of space in
which to dispose of hazardous waste and MSW, fierce opposition is
likely whenever someone attempts to site a new disposal facility for
either type of waste. 190
187 See O'HARE, supra note 12, at vii; Denis J. Brion, An Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and
the Problem of Distributive Justice, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 437, 437-38; Tarlock,
supra note 3, at 429. But see infra note 249 and accompanying text.
188 See Brion, Supra note 187, at 438; Delogu, supra note 3, at 198; Bernd Holznagel,
Negotiation and Mediation: The Newest Approach to Hazardous Waste Facility Siting, 13
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 329, 337 (1986).
189 See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 10, at 265-67; Brion, supra note 187, at 451; Mary R.
English, The Search for Political Authority in Massachusetts' Toxic Waste Management Law,
16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 39, 41 (1988); Reilly, supra note 185, at 68-72.
190 See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 10, at 265-67; Brion, supra note 187, at 437-47;
English, supra note 189, at 41 n.12 (''The Massachusetts experience is not unique; nationally,
at least fifty percent of the proposals made under state hazardous waste facility siting programs
have failed.") (footnote omitted).
In spite of the high demand for hazardous waste facilities, a 1984 report by the
Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council . . . shows that, pur-
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Massachusetts is one of several states that have attempted to use
alternative dispute resolution techniques-particularly negotiation
over the amount of compensation owed to a community that ''hosts''
a waste disposal facility-to overcome NIMBY opposition to the
siting of hazardous and solid waste disposal facilities. 191 To date,
"negotiated compensation" has had a mixed record of success. 192 In
many cases, it has failed to overcome public concerns about a facility's impacts on health, safety, and the environment. 193 This failure
suggests that developers of waste disposal facilities should address
public concerns about the safety of their projects.
A developer may be able to bolster its credibility about building
a safe waste disposal facility if it offers to clean up a contaminated
site in the municipality where it wants to build. Given the potentially
huge expense involved in restoring contaminated property, the developer also can provide a significant economic incentive by agreeing
to clean up, for example, an MSW landfill site that the municipality
otherwise would have to clean up. This Article proposes that developers of new hazardous and solid waste disposal facilities negotiate
with municipalities to remediate an orphan or MSW landfill site in
exchange for the municipality's promise of supporting the construction of the developer's proposed facility. This proposal may work
where other efforts at negotiated compensation have failed if the
suant to new state hazardous waste siting statutes, only eight facilities have been
approved for operation in the United States. As of 1984, there have been thirty-two
siting attempts: eighteen failed, three were still in court, three were in the process
of approval, and only eight were approved.
Holznagel, supra note 188, at 336 (footnote omitted); see also Tarlock, supra note 3, at 429.
But see infra note 249 and accompanying text.
191 See MAss GEN. L. ch. 21D, §§ 12-15 (1988); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a114 to 34r (West 1985 & Supp. 1991) (statute providing communities ,vith choice between
fixed assessment and negotiated compensation with ceiling on total amount of compensation,
and providing arbitration if negotiations fail); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.7 to -35 (1989 & Supp.
1991) (statute providing negotiation and arbitration); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.43-.445 (West
Supp. 1989) (statute providing voluntary mediation and binding arbitration by Waste Facility
Siting Board if negotiations fail); Arthur J. Harrington, The Right to a Decent Burial:
Hazardous Waste and Its Regulation in Wisconsin, 66 MARQ. L. REV. 223, 262rli6 (1983)
(discussing Wisconsin statute); Holznagel, supra note 188, at 329-78 (discussing Connecticut,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin statutes). See generally Mary Beth Arnett,
Comment, Down in the Dumps and Wasted: The Need Determination in the Wisconsin
Landfill Siting Process, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 543.
192 See Brion, supra note 187, at 447-48; English, supra note 189, at 41; see also supra
note 190 and accompanying text; infra notes 247-48 and accompanying text. But see infra
note 249 and accompanying text.
193 See Brion, supra note 187, at 447-52; English, supra note 189, at 41.

274

ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS

[Vol. 19:239

public believes that the developer can perform the remediation more
quickly and at less expense to the public purse.

A. Negotiated Compensation
Recognizing that the various approaches of other states had failed
to overcome NIMBY opposition to hazardous and solid waste facilities, the Massachusetts legislature in 1980 enacted a negotiated
compensation statute, the Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility
Siting Act. 194 Some states had established statewide siting boards
with the power to preempt local zoning and other land use ordinances
designed to bar controversial facilities. 195 Experience has demonstrated, however, that preemption alone does not diffuse local opposition and in fact may intensify it.196 Local officials may put pressure on state officials to block a project even if a statewide siting
board is willing to approve the proposed facility.197 Local officials
and residents, through the legal process or by extralegal means, can
delay a project until pursuing it becomes economically futile for its
developer. 198
Scholars at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and
Harvard University created the concept of negotiated compensation
and later drafted the Massachusetts statute to address what they
perceived as a' defect in the democratic process. 199 Let us assume
that the benefits of a hazardous waste disposal facility outweigh the
disadvantages. These benefits, however, are spread among many
194 See O'HARE, supra note 12, at 182; Bacow & Milkey, supra note 10, at 273-74; Ho1znagel,
supra note 188, at 354-55.
195 See, e.g., MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-705 (1989 & Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 115A.28(2), (3) (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); OIDO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.05(3) (Anderson
1988 & Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1446 (Michie 1989); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.43.445 (West 1989); see also Bacow & Milkey, supra note 10, at 270-72 (discussing state statutes
that preempt local zoning); Holznagel, supra note 188, at 348-50; Tarlock, supra note 3, at
438-48; supra note 191 and accompanying text.
196 See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 10, at 272-74; Holznagel, supra note 188, at 351-52.
197 See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 10, at 272-74; Holznagel, supra note 188, at 351-52.
198 See English, supra note 189, at 41; Ho1znagel, supra note 188, at 337; see also supra
notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
199 See O'HARE, supra note 12, at 67-71; Bacow & Milkey, supra note 10, at 275-78;
Holznagel, supra note 188, at 355-57. Michael O'Hare began his work on negotiated compensation at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), continued it at Harvard, and was
working for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts when Massachusetts adopted the statute;
Lawrence Bacow was a faculty member at MIT while the legislature was developing the
statute, and served on the siting council that the statute created; Debra Sanderson was a
graduate student at MIT who worked for the Commonwealth while the legislature drafted
the statute, and thereafter continued in state service. O'HARE, supra note 12, at vii-ix.
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beneficiaries, including stockholders and customers, who each have
only a small stake in the benefits and who therefore are unlikely to
participate actively in the political process to support the project. 2oo
Opponents of the project are sometimes ideologically driven environmentalist groups, but more often are local citizens who believe
that the project will have a detrimental effect on their health and
their property values. 201 It is relatively simple to organize a strong
NIMBY group, because residents in one municipality can put strong
social pressure on their uncommitted friends and neighbors to join
the groUp.202 In most circumstances, a developer will be unable to
organize its project's potential beneficiaries, because the cost of
organization will be high, and the developer may lack political legitimacy because of its perceived stake in the outcome. 203 Thus, a few
citizens may be able to raise enough political opposition to block a
project that has a net social benefit. Furthermore, even if the
NIMBY group loses all of its battles in the courts or the political
arena, it may win in the end if the delays resulting from its activities
make the project a financial loser. 204
Our representative democracy is poorly equipped to resolve conflicts that involve diffuse benefits for a large number of people at
the expense of great losses for a particular community.205 Negotiated
compensation attempts to solve this problem. It seeks to lessen local
opposition by providing compensation to people who perceive that a
project may harm them. 206 Proponents of negotiated compensation,
however, have been too optimistic and somewhat simplistic in assuming that money alone will convince local residents to accept a
potentially dangerous project. It is important to realize that safety
is not usually a negotiable issue. If local citizens believe, either
rightly or wrongly, that a project is not safe, they will view offers
of compensation as bribery attempts and likely will reject them. 207
200 See O'HARE, supra note 12, at 68-71; Bacow & Milkey, supra note 10, at 275-78;-Ho1znagel, supra note 188, at 355-57. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION-PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
201 See O'HARE, supra note 12, at 68-71.
202 See id.
203 See id.
2G4 See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
205 See LESTER THURow, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY 11-18 (1980); Katherine R. Shanabrook,
Note, Low-Level- Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility Sitings: Negotiating a Role Jor the
Public, 3 Omo ST. J. ON DlSP. RESOL. 219, 230 (1987).
206 See O'HARE, supra note 12, at 67-71; Ho1znagel, supra note 188, at 355.
m See DOUGLAS J. AMY, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION 190 (1987);
Shanabrook, supra note 205, at 231.
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A developer, as well as the government officials supporting a project,
must gain the trust of a substantial majority of these citizens by
providing timely and accurate information about the risks associated
with the project and the steps the developer is taking to reduce
those risks. 208
There are several types of compensation that a developer of a
waste disposal facility may offer a local community.209 First, the
developer can take preventative measures to avoid or reduce the
likelihood that the' facility will have adverse impacts on the community. For instance, the developer could install a groundwater
monitoring system, double liners, and a leachate collection system
to prevent any hazardous substances from escaping the facility and
entering the groundwater. Second, the developer can implement
measures to reverse or mitigate any adverse impacts that do occur.
The developer might agree to provide money or equipment to improve fire and police response capabilities in case of an accident, or
to place buffers of vacant land around the facility to protect neighbors in the event of a fire or explosion at the facility.
Third, there are numerous compensatory benefits that the developer may give to either the municipal government or affected individuals. 210 The developer may provide tax benefits to the municipality or direct cash payments to indiViduals. 211 Another relatively rare
means of allaying the concerns of residents is to guarantee property
values or provide insurance to do SO.212 Such guarantees, however,
can be very expensive, and developers are likely to place upper
limits on their liability.213 A developer also may offer in-kind compensation by, for example, providing a park if its proposed facility
will occupy formerly scenic land. Finally, the developer of a hazardous waste disposal facility or MSW landfill may have special technical
expertise in waste site remediation and can offer to clean up an
208 SITING HAzARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITIES: A HANDBOOK 11-12 (1983)
[hereinafter SITING]. This handbook was a collaborative effort by the Conservation Foundation, the Chemical Manufacturers Association, and the National Audubon Society.
2D9 ANDREWS, supra note 15, at 112-13; O'HARE, supra note 12, at 72-73; HoIznagel, supra
note 188, at 356.
210 See ANDREWS, supra note 15, at 112-13; O'HARE, supra note 12, at 72-73; Ho1znagel,
supra note 188, at 356.
211 See ANDREWS, supra note 15, at 112-13; O'HARE, supra note 12, at 72-73; Ho1znagel,
supra note 188, at 356.
212 See O'HARE, supra note 12, at 86; SITING, supra note 208, at 17-18; see also infra note
213 and accompanying text.
213 See SITING, supra note 208, at 17-18. But see O'HARE, supra note 12, at 86 (taking
more optimistic view of willingness of developers to guarantee property values).
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abandoned site in exchange for permission to develop that site or
another property. 214
A state can take several approaches to determining compensation.
Its legislature can establish a formula such as Connecticut's limit of
2.5% of quarterly gross receipts over $2.5 million. 215 There is a
serious question, however, as to whether legislative formulas based
on a fixed percentage of receipts are flexible enough to adapt to
varying circumstances. 216 In the alternative, a statewide siting board
could make an administrative determination regarding the amount
of compensation on a case-by-case basis; however, it is difficult for
the government to set values in the absence of a free market, and
there can be high transaction costS. 217 Lastly, the developer and the
community simply can negotiate the amount of compensation. 218
B. Critiques of Negotiated Compensation

Some commentators have criticized the Massachusetts negotiated
compensation model on the grounds that it is coercive, does not
adequately represent local citizens, and fails to address safety concerns. 219 These critiques of negotiated compensation best can be
understood as part of a broader attack on the use of mediation to
resolve environmental disputes. Accordingly, it will be helpful to
examine mediation.
Mediation is different from other forms of alternative dispute
resolution, such as arbitration, because of its voluntary nature and
its focus on achieving a consensus among the parties. 220 A mediator
tries to improve communication among the participants without
pushing her own ideas on them. 221 By contrast, arbitration may be
compulsory, may involve a quasi-trial, and usually results in a decision by one or more neutral factfinders rather than a negotiated
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-l28 (West 1985 & Supp. 1990); see also Holznagel,
supra note 188, at 373-74 (discussing Connecticut formula).
216 O'HARE, supra note 12, at 84-85.
217 See id. at 85.
218 See id. at 85-86; Holznagel, supra note 188, at 374; Jeff Bailey, Economics of Trash,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1991, at AI, A9 (benefits from presence of landfills in localities vary
greatly depending on localities' bargaining skills and fees).
219 See, e.g., AMY, supra note 207, at 149-53, 189-90, 216-19; Brion, supra note 187, at
214

216

447-52.
220 See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL ,ApPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLlC DISPUTES 162r-65 (1987).
221

See id. at 163.
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settlement that the parties themselves achieve. 222 Disputants have
used mediation to resolve a wide range of disputes including various
types of environmental controversies. 223
Massachusetts and other states adopting the negotiated compensation approach have engendered a great deal of controversy over
the fact that their statutes essentially force a developer and a host
community to mediate their dispute successfully.224 Typically, these
statutes require that, if mediation fails, either a state siting board
or an arbitrator-and not the concerned parties-make the final
decision about siting.225 In addition, one leading scholar on environmental mediation, Douglas Amy, has argued that negotiated compensation is not true mediation because negotiated compensation
statutes do not leave to interested parties the choice about whether
to employ mediation. 226
At its best, mediation offers the possibility that affected citizens
and other interests, together with local officials, can reach a political
solution to a siting controversy rather than leave the decisionmaking
process to the judiCiary, an administrative bureaucracy, or an arbitrator. '227 Mediators usually seek to include representatives from all
significant interest groups, and their success in getting parties to
the table may determine the likelihood of success.228 In 1974, several
interest groups supporting the proposed construction of the Westway highway project in New York City hired an experienced mediator to help resolve difficulties in the project's progress. '229 They invited a wide spectrum of other interest groups to participate. The
See id.
See, e.g., GAIL BINGHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A DECADE OF
EXPERIENCE xvii-xix (1986) (discussing growing trend toward mediation in resolving disputes
in environmental politics). See generally AMY, supra note 207; SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK,
supra note 220; Joseph P. Tomain, Land Use Mediation/ar Planners, 7 MEDIATION Q. 163
(1989) (mediation provides alternative to litigation for land use disputes).
224 See AMY, supra note 207, at 216-19.
225 See id. In Connecticut and Wisconsin, the state siting board has the final decision if the
host cOmn1unity resists negotiation, whereas in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, an independent arbitrator makes the final decision. See Holznagel, supra note 188, at 377.
226 See AMY, supra note 207, at 146-53.
= See Douglas J. Amy, Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Promise and the Pitfalls,
in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990s 211, 215-20 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft
eds., 1990) [hereinafter 1990s]. But see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J.
1073, 1076-78 (1984) (criticizing ADR movement and arguing that courts are better equipped
to protect constitutional rights of minorities); David Schoenbrod, Limits and Dangers 0/
Environmental Mediation: A Review Essay, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1453, 1470-71 (1983) (mediation can involve delegation of public duties and result in dilution of statutory mandates).
228 See SITING, supra note 208, at 8-11; Daniel Riesel, Negotiation and Mediation 0/
Environmental Disputes, 1 Omo ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 99, 104-08 (1985).
229 Riesel, supra note 228, at 105.
222
223
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mediation failed, however, in part because the Mayor and Governor
of New York refused to join the mediation process. 230 In the context
of siting waste facilities, another important consideration is whether
to include representatives from nearby communities that may suffer
as a result of increased traffic, odor, or risk of harm to human health
and the environment, but receive no tax benefits. 231
One difficult issue for parties considering mediation is whether
some of the parties to a dispute should proceed with the mediation
if the other parties refuse to be bound by any resulting agreement.
For example, in 1976, a long dispute involving the siting of an
interstate highway in Seattle, Washington, had reached an impasse,
and the governor of Washington asked state transportation officials
and political leaders from opposing communities in the proposed path
of the highway to mediate their differences. 232 The parties decided
to mediate the dispute despite the refusal of important environmental groups to be bound by the results of the process.233 State and
local officials eventually accepted a compromise agreement, and the
environmental groups failed in their legal challenge to the project's
final environmental impact statement (FE IS) at least in part because
the mediated settlement was included in the FEIS.234
Although mediation has been effective in resolving a variety of
environmental disputes, including siting controversies, it is important to recognize that not all such disputes are amenable to mediation.235 There is considerable scholarly controversy over whether
mediation resolves disputes more quickly and at less cost than litigation. Because each case is different, it has been impossible to make
scientifically rigorous comparisons between alternative dispute resolution and traditional litigation. 236
See id. at 106.
See O'HARE, supra note 12, at 7; HoJznagel, supra note 188, at 362 (noting that under
title 990, § 8.02(1)(g) of Massachusetts Administrative Code, chief executive officer of host
community can invite up to four people from abutting communities to be members of local
assessment committee).
230

231

232 ALLAN R. TALBOT, SETl'LING THINGS: SIX CASE STUDIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION 33 (1983).

[d.
[d. at 38.
235 Compare BINGHAM, supra note 223, at 72-73 (analyzing 132 mediations, including 86
cases involving land use disputes, and arguing that mediation led to successful resolutions
78% of time) and Richard C. Collins, The Emergence oj Environmental Mediation, 10 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. vi-x (1990) (director of Institute for Enviromnental Negotiation at University
of Virgina discussing program's success) with AMY, supra note 207, at 215-16 (agreeing with
Gerald Cormick, leader in field of enviromnental mediation, who estimates that only 10% of
enviromnental disputes are suitable for mediation).
236 See Joseph P. Tomain & Jo Ann Lutz, A Model jor Court-Annexed Mediation, 5 Omo
233

23-1
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An important issue in this controversy has been the extent to
which the mediation process can overcome differences among parties
in monetary, technical, and informational resources. Should a mediator attempt to assure a level playing field, or should she let the
. balance of power among the participants decide the outcome? Critics
of mediation have emphasized that the informal atmosphere of mediation may fool less sophisticated parties, such as citizen groups,
and lead them to accept a less favorable resolution than they could
have achieved through litigation.237 Conversely, these critics charge,
other parties or even the mediator may coerce less capable parties
into entering an unwise settlement.238 Moreover, for many citizen
groups, individual citizens, and even municipalities, the costs of
obtaining technical information or hiring an experienced negotiator
may be too great, leaving most developers with a distinct advantage.239 In some cases, the public process of litigation may afford
greater protection not only to minority interests, but also to the
majority of the public, whose individual members lack the resources
of industry or government bureaucracy. 240
Another factor that potential parties to mediation must consider
is confidentiality. Mediators almost universally recommend that discussions between a mediator and a party or among parties be confidential and therefore exempt from discovery in subsequent litigation.241 In 1990, Congress enacted confidentiality requirements in the
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 5-13 (1989) (existing scholarship is divided concerning success of
alternative dispute resolution techniques). Campare BINGHAM, supra note 223, at xxv-xxvii
(although costs of mediation are hard to compare to those of litigation, typical time to litigate
environmental case in federal courts, from filing to conclusion of trial, is 23 months, while
median time for environmental dispute resolution is five to six months) with AMY, supra note
227, at 221-22 (questioning whether environmental dispute resolution is cheaper and faster
than litigation) and Frank P. Grad, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Environmental Law,
14 COLUlIf. J. ENVTL. L. 157, 185 (1989) (noting that it is not clear whether ADR provides
significant savings over litigation).
237 See, e.g., Amy, supra note 227, at 223-24 (criticizing imbalance of power in environmental
dispute resolution); J. Walton Blackburn, Environmental Mediation as an Alternative to
Litigation, 16 POL'y STUD. J. 562, 568-72 (1988) (comparing mediation to litigation). But Bee
Lawrence Susskind & Scott McCreary, Techniques/or Resolving Coastal Resource ManagementDisputes Through Negotiation, AM. PLAN AsS'N J., Summer 1985, at 365, 365-73 (noting
that ability of any party to walk out from negotiations creates balance of power).
238 See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
239 See AMY, supra note 207, at 143; Riesel, supra note 228, at 109-10.
240 See supra notes 227, 237-39 and accompanying text.
241 See, e.g., Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation:
The Need/or Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 37, 37-39 (1986); Eric D. Green, A
Heretical View 0/ Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 1-2 (1986) (acknowledging that most mediators favor blanket confidentiality and arguing for more limited mediator's privilege); Karen L. Liepman, Note, Confidentiality in Environmental Mediation:
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Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, which governs mediation
involving federal agencies.242 Critics charge that confidentiality laws
violate the spirit of open democratic government. 243
Defenders of mediation and negotiated compensation argue that
parties should try mediation in cases where they cannot readily come
to an agreement and expensive litigation looms.244 They note that a
citizen group always can walk away from mediation if it believes
that the process is unfair. 245 Furthermore, advocates of mediation
contend that litigation is more expensive and time-consuming than
mediation, and that overloaded courts do not necessarily reach better
decisions or encourage more equitable settlements than mediators.246
Massachusetts and the other states with statutes promoting negotiated compensation generally have failed to overcome public opposition to siting hazardous and solid waste facilities. 247 Public fears
about the safety of these facilities have been the biggest obstacle to
siting, with economic and aesthetic concerns also major causes for
opposition.248 Recently, however, some communities have been willing to accept waste disposal facilities in exchange for compensation.
Some scholars have called this nascent trend the "Yes-In-My-BackYard" (YIMBY) syndrome. 249 In some cases, political leaders in a
municipality initially have been interested in the potential economic
benefits of a proposed waste facility, but have backed out of negotiations in response to public uproar about safety concerns.250 GenSlwuld Third Parties Have Access to the Process?, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 93, 94-95
(1986).
242 PUB. L. No. 101-552, § 584, 104 Stat. 2736, 2740-41 (1990).
243 See Tomain & Lutz, supra note 236, at 7 (central criticism of mediation is privatism and
consequent reduction in publicity).
244 See AMY, supra note 207, at 27-28.
245 Id. at 38.
246 Id. at 18-23, 26; Amy, supra note 227, at 215-20.
247 See Brion, supra note 187, at 447-48; English, supra note 189, at 41; supra notes 19094 and accompanying text. But see infra note 249 and accompanying text.
248 See Brion, supra note 187, at 450-51; see also supra notes 187-93, 207-08, 247 and
accompanying text.
249 See Daniel Mazmanian & David Morell, The "NIMBY" Syndrome: Facility Siting and
the Failure oj Democratic Discourse, in 1990s, supra note 227, at 125, 125-43 (discussing
YIMBY approach of Southern California Hazardous Waste Management Authority); Katz,
YIMBYism is Coming But . .. ,21 WASTE AGE 40,40-41 (1990) (many communities are
willing to.accept projects for guaranteed annual ''host'' fee, guaranteed property values, and
various payments toward environmental improvements benefiting host community); Meyers,
supra note 11, at 572; John A. Barnes, Learning to Love the Dump Next Door, WALL ST. J.,
June 25, 1991, at A18 (editorial describing success oflandfill in Riverview, Michigan). But see
supra notes 187-93, 207-08, 247-48 and accompanying text.
250 See, e.g., YIMBY? Novel Plan Aims Jor a "Yes in My Backyard" Attitude on Noxious
Sites, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 11,1991, at Al (Browning-Ferris Industries and Yorkshire, New
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erally, developers of hazardous and solid waste disposal facilities
must do a better job of convincing the public that their projects are
safe. They may be able to quell some doubts by emphasizing preventative measures, although citizen opposition may remain widespread even in light of strict safety measures.251
While economic incentives can be useful, the developer of a waste
disposal facility that offers only ·cash compensation to a potential
host community is unlikely to overcome public opposition. More often
than not, developers of waste disposal facilities have failed to convince anybody that a community would be at less risk by accepting
a proposed facility. A mediator can assist a developer and a community in negotiating a compensation package that includes stringent safety measures. In fact, a developer can improve a community's health, safety, and environment by cleaning up a contaminated
orphan or MSW landfill site and replacing it witJI a modern, secure
waste disposal facility. Furthermore, if a developer cleans up an
orphan or MSW landfill site, a community may reduce or eliminate
a potentially large CERCLA liability.
V. REMEDIATION AND REUSE: A NEW APPLICATION FOR
NEGOTIATED COMPENSATION

While negotiated compensation does not work in all cases, a developer may be able to convince a community to accept a new waste
disposal facility in exchange for the developer's conducting remedial
actions at an orphan or MSW landfill site.252 Although the developer
still would need to convince the community's residents that the
proposed project was safe and worthwhile, the promise to remediate
a toxic dump site endangering the entire municipality is a powerful
selling point. Taxpayers who are facing an enormous bill for cleaning
up their town's or county's MSW landfill site might be willing to
accept a new waste disposal facility if the facility's developer assumed part or all of the cleanup costs for the old landfill. Furthermore, the developer could emphasize that it can perform an effective
cleanup more quickly and at less expense than the municipality, the
state, or the EPA, and could argue that building a new facility is
more safe than continuing to operate an old one.
York negotiated for several months regarding landfill site, but town backed out as result of
public opposition).
251 See Meyers, supra note 11, at 572 n.36.
252 See supra notes 15, 186 and accompanying text.
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In some cases, it may be impossible to reuse a contaminated site,
for instance because the site is located near an aquifer that supplies
drinking water to public or private wells. A developer still could
remediate the site in exchange for municipal support for siting its
new facility. Whether the developer would pay the entire cost of the
cleanup or part of the cost in conjunction with other parties would
be left to negotiations. In addition, such negotiations could address
whether the developer or the municipality would direct remediation
efforts. By cleaning up old sites and creating less risky new facilities,
developers and communities may be able, in the long run, to reduce
NIMBY opposition and lower future CERCLA liability.
While this Article suggests that negotiated compensation may be
more politically practical than some types of incentive systems, it
does not mean to suggest that there is no room for economic incentives beyond those available in negotiated compensation. Stroup's
proposed auction system and the concepts of tax credits, tax deductions, and exactions and linkage fees are not inherently incompatible
with negotiated compensation. Under Stroup's system, a company
that seeks to build a new hazardous waste disposal facility might
acquire an old site at an EPA auction and then negotiate with the
local government for permission to carry out its development plan.
Depending upon the incentives provided in the Internal Revenue
Code, either tax credits or tax deductions could encourage more
developers of new facilities to acquire old sites rather than "virgin"
sites. Voluntary negotiated compensation is conceptually at odds
with enforced exactions and linkage fees, but large developers with
choices about where to build commercial projects probably have
some flexibility to negotiate over the number and type of exactions
that they will accept before they turn to another city to locate the
project.
There are other economic incentives that states or the federal
government could provide to improve the chances for successful
negotiations. For example, some states provide low-interest loans
to assist recipients financially in removing and replacing leaking
underground storage tanks.253 States or the federal government similarly could provide loans to developers who pledge to reuse or clean
253 See, e.g., Michigan Underground Storage Tank Financial Assurance Act, MICH. COMPo
LAWS ANN. §§ 299.801-.828 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990); Minnesota Petroleum Tank Release
Cleanup Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 115C.01-.1O (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); Tennessee Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-53-101 to 68-53-128 (Supp.
1990); see also Martin, supra note 12, at 12-13 (discussing these three statutes).
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up abandoned orphan or MSW landfill sites. Of course, in these tight
fiscal times, legislatures may be reluctant to provide funding for
such an untested program even if this type of loan might speed up
waste site cleanups in their states. There are also various types of
state and local property and income tax relief that could encourage
reuse or remediation,254 but again, any such measures depend upon
convincing political leaders that the measures are necessary and
beneficial to the public interest.
The most significant problem with negotiated compensation is its
local focus. Groundwater pollution from an operating or abandoned
waste facility may affect many communities beyond the one in which
the facility is located,255 and once groundwater is contaminated, it
may be impossible to restore its purity.256 As a result, some communities have established aquifer protection zones.257 It is questionable whether a local ordinance can solve such a regional problem.
Because of the regional nature of pollution from waste disposal facilities, surrounding communities should have a greater role in negotiating compensation. The Massachusetts negotiated compensation
statute permits a community that ''hosts'' a new facility to grant
surrounding communities a role in negotiations and possibly in compensation.258 States enacting statutes similar to that in Massachusetts could include similar provisions, and communities in states that
do not adopt such a statute could invite their neighbors to participate, perhaps in exchange for the provision of certain municipal
services or some other consideration.259
See generally Martin, supra note 12, at 6-8.
See Corash & Behrendt, supra note 58, at 881 n.132 (single hazardous waste facility
may contaminate entire geographic region by polluting aquifer, bay, or lake).
2S6 See David Stipp, Super Waste?: Throwing Good Money at Bad Water Yields Scant
Improvement, WALL. ST. J., May 15, 1991, at AI, col. 1; see also supra note 255 and
accompanying text. An EPA official has stated that the agency will issue a policy statement
spelling out when it is "technically impractical" to remove dense nonaqueous phase liquids,
which are heavier than water and tend to sink through the water table, from groundwater.
Policy on Remedy Selection to Address 'Impracticable' Ground Water Cleanups, 22 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1363, 1363-64 (Sept. 27, 1991). ''The contaminants include semivolatile chemicals
and halogenated volatile chemicals typically found in solvents, wood preserving wastes (including creosote and pentachlorophenol), coal tars, and pesticides. They are of particular
concern to the agency because they are frequently found at Superfund sites." Id. at 1363.
257 See, e.g., Town of Washington, Dutchess County, New York, Zoning Law, art. II, § 314,
Aquifer Protection Overlay District Regulations (adopted Dec. 27, 1989 and effective Jan. 1,
1990) (adding aquifer protection overlay zone). For a discussion of the regional nature of
aquifer contamination, see supra note 255 and accompanying text.
258 See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
259 Achieving greater regional cooperation in negotiating with operators of new facilities
and remediating hazardous waste sites may require a shift to a more regional tax base. St.
2S4
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CONCLUSION

While this Article proposes the use of negotiated compensation to
encourage developers of new waste disposal facilities to reuse or at
least clean up abandoned waste sites, the problems of siting and
remediation are complex, and solving them will require a number of
different approaches. In some cases, the EPA itself will have to
conduct a cleanup of an abandoned site using Superfund monies. For
many orphan sites, the uncertainties of remediation may be too great
for any private developer to take the risk, regardless of the incentives. Negotiated compensation will fail in many cases, including
cases in which a developer offers to reuse or clean up an abandoned
site. For problems as complex as remediating the nation's scores of
old waste sites and developing the many needed, less risky, new
facilities, however, creative solutions are necessary.
Paul and Minneapolis, Minnesota have been part of a seven-county tax base sharing area since
1971, and other conununities have discussed implementing the tax base sharing concept. See
Jack L. Dustin et al., Tax Base Sharing: The Potential and Experience, in TAX BASE
SHARING: AN EVALUATION OF ITS USE AND ITS POTENTIAL IN THE STATE OF OHIO 3, 6-14

(Jack L. Dustin ed., 1990). See generally Note, Minnesota's Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities
Act-An Experiment in Tax Base Sharing, 59 MINN. L. REV. 927 (1975). A full discussion of
what role tax base sharing might have in improving regional cooperation to solve environmental problems is beyond the scope of this Article. I wish to thank Charles Ellison and Sam
Noe of the University of Cincinnati's School of Planning for alerting me to the concept of tax
base sharing.

